

ABSTRACT

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
This study focuses on a servant in the fiscal administration of the Bukharan emirate, Mirza Salim bik (1848 or 1850 - 1930) who reached the peak of his career between 1917 and 1920, a time of tension in Bukhara. He certainly was no admirer of the *jadid* movement, so this study also is a tentative, albeit hopefully also a rather circumspect attempt to write a biography of a Bukharan *qadim*, although admittedly maybe not a very typical one. The paper thus also aims at shedding some light on the hitherto neglected "old style" intellectuals (*qadimchilar*) in Central Asia. It uses published and unpublished sources, historiography as well as archival documents and personal narratives. It uses a broad range of Soviet and post-Soviet as well as Western scholarship.

Additionally, the evolution of concepts of time and space in Central Asian historiography plays a significant part in the paper.

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Franz Wennberg

AN INQUIRY INTO BUKHARAN QADIMISM:

Mirza Salim-bik

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**An Inquiry into Bukharan *Qadīmism*
– Mīrzā Salīm-bīk**



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Introduction

What would be a typical case of Bukharan *qadīmism*, an opponent of the early 20th century Central Asian Islamic reform movement usually called *jadīdism*?¹ Would it be one among many hitherto unknown wild-bearded illiterate pedophilic *qalandars* (stray mystics...) who smoked opium, threw stones at passing trains, and called for *jihād* against the Russian infidels from various *madrasas* (higher educational institutions) and half-ruined Sufi-convents on the Bukharan countryside, who not only knew nothing about social and technological progress in the West, but also knowing nothing about mainstream Sunni Islam? Or was he to be found in the capital, in the multitude of *‘ulamā* (Islamic scholars)? Would a typical case be the ‘reactionary’ *qāzī-yi kalān* (chief judge), Burhān al-Dīn, who was allegedly one of the arch-enemies of the ‘progressive’ Muslim reformists, the *Jadīds*, when he served as *qāzī-yi kalān* in the emirate between 1914 and 1920, and allegedly vehemently persecuted them after the abortive first serious call for reform in 1917, and again after the first Bolshevik attempt to invade Bukhara a year later?

Fortunately, some pioneers have already begun to let the rat smell out from Bukhara’s noise-abatement zones, and we can in all confidence state that the – isms are indeed falling; what seems to survive are *dynamic solidarity networks* and individuals who only have *unwavering personalities* for lovers and other extremists.² Indeed we do not know what happened to

¹ For *qadīmism* in general, see Stéphane A. Dudoignon, “Qu’est-ce que la ‘qadīmiya’? Éléments de sociologie du traditionalisme musulman, en islam de Russie et en Transoxiane (de la fin du XVIII^e siècle au début du XX^e),” *L’Islam de Russie. Conscience communautaire et autonomie politique chez les Tatars de la Volga et de l’Oural, depuis le XVIII^e siècle*, eds. Stéphane A. Dudoignon, Dāmir Is’haqov, and Rāfyq Mhāmmātshin (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 1997); and by the same author “Status, Strategies and Discourses of a Muslim ‘Clergy’ under Christian Law: Polemics about the Collection of the *Zakāt* in Late Imperial Russia,” *Islam in Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Eighteenth to Late Twentieth Centuries)*, eds. Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Komatsu Hisao (London: Kegan Paul, 2001).

² For the role of solidarity networks in Bukharan politics during the 1910s, see Adeeb Khalid, “Society and politics in Bukhara 1868–1910,” *Central*

all the *qalandars* after the establishment of Soviet government, but Burhān al-Dīn's personality was 'enshrined' in Soviet historiography after he had been sentenced to death by a revolutionary court established after Mikhail Frunze's alleged liberation of Bukhara in 1920 and headed by one of Bukhara's wealthiest merchants, while one of his sons, Asli Burhonov, made a career as an actor in Tajikistan, and was not only awarded the title: People's Artist of the Republic, but was also the first to play the role of Lenin there.

Although we have some excellent studies on *jadīdism* and those who supported the new-method schools,³ the same thing cannot be said about *qadīmism*, especially not of Bukharan *qadīmism* where the main sources are still Šadr al-Dīn 'Aynī and Fayzullāh Khwājaev's accounts, first codified after 1920. These accounts were integrated to in Soviet history through a number of other publications and the result was that the *Qadīms* were deprived of a voice of their own. Studies of Bukharan *qadīmism* were further complicated by an apparent absence of relevant sources; the handful of names of *Qadīms* that the Bukharan *Jadīds* have provided us with so far have not appeared as a signature of an original author or even as a copier of a manuscript, book or article.

Asian Survey 19 (2000); Stéphane A. Dudoignon, "La Question Scolaire à Boukhara et au Turkestan, du 'premier renouveau' à la soviétisation (fin du XVIIIe siècle – 1937)," *Cahiers du monde russe* 37 (1996); A.A. Semenov, *Ocherk ustroistva tsentral'nogo administrativnogo upravleniya Bukharskogo khanstva pozdneishago vremeni* (Dushanbe: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Tadzhikskoi SSR, 1954) 66; and 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Fiṭrat's work about the 1910s in which he provides some information about Burhān al-Dīn and his relatives: Fiṭrat, *Davrai Hukmroni Amir Olimkhon* (Dushanbe: Palatai Davlatii Kitobho, 1991) 30.

³ I am primarily thinking of Stéphane A. Dudoignon's *Lectures de la Modernité en Islam Centralasiatique. La réforme des institutions d'enseignement éthique, théologique et juridique dans le monde tatar et en Transoxiane, du "premier renouveau" à la soviétisation (1767–1937)* diss., Paris 3, 1996; and Adeeb Khalid's *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform. Jadidism in Central Asia* (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: U of California P. 1998).

Focus and Scope

This study focuses on a servant in the fiscal administration, one of the so-called *umarā*. He was known as Mīrzā Salīm-bīk,⁴ and reached the peak of his career between 1917 and 1920, i.e. during the years when the *Jadīds* had their toughest time before the heyday of Stalinist salvation. Salīm-bīk was thus no admirer of *jadīdism*, at least not during this period, so this is a tentative, albeit hopefully also a rather circumspect attempt to write a biography of a Bukharan *Qadīm*, although admittedly, maybe not a very typical one.⁵

The point of departure is the political arena and its key actors during the protectorate era. Most other studies on the domestic politics in Bukhara during this time have been removed from the accounts of the *'ulamā*, while the *umarā* have largely been ignored. One explanation for this is obviously that the 'progressive' *Jadīds* came mainly from the *'ulamā*, and almost all Soviet research on the political struggle in Bukhara has been based on their accounts. However, the *umarā* cooperated far more closely with the tsarist authorities, and they seem, in general, to have been considered as far more reliable than the *'ulamā* who underwent a different socialization, and were

⁴ Some research has been done on Mīrzā Salīm-bīk already. Alexandr Alexandrovich Semenov wrote a hitherto unpublished paper called *Bukharskii istorik poslednego feodal'nogo perioda khanstva (Mirza Mukhammed Salim-bek "parvonachi")*, which today is kept in the archives of Presidium of the Academy of Sciences in Dushanbe, Semenov's archive, op. 21, ex. 24. L.M. Épifanova wrote about Salīm-bīk in her *Rukopisnye istochniki Instituta Vostokovedeniya Akademii Nauk UzSSR po istorii Srednei Azii perioda prisoedineniya k Rossii (Bukhara)* (Tashkent: Nauka, 1965). Naim Norkulov has written two articles and a *kandidat* dissertation: "'Ta'rikh-i Salimi' kak istoricheskii istochnik," *Obshchestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane* [Tashkent] 4 (1966); "Mirza Salimbek o Bukharskikh sobytiyakh 1918 goda," *Obshchestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane* [Tashkent] 4 (1967); *'Tarikh-i Salimi' – tsennyi istochnik po istorii Bukharskogo emirata (1860–1920gg.)*, *kandidat-diss.*, Tashkent State U, 1968; A.B. Vil'danova "Tsennyi istochnik po istorii Bukharskogo khanstva," *Materialy po Vostoku* (Tashkent: Nauka, 1966).

⁵ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk has, as far as I know, never been referred to as a *Qadīm*, but Naim Norkulov wrote that he belonged to the reactionary circles, something which points towards *Qadīmism* (Norkulov, *'Tarikh-i Salimi' – tsennyi* 5).

frequently regarded as group of fanatics, pan-Islamists, and pan-Turkists (the *Jadids* included). The relationships between the *umarā* as well as between the *ulamā* and *umarā* have escaped attention since the early 1920s. However, before the revolution the *umarā* were given a much larger focus, not only by the Russian authorities, but also in the Russian press.

I propose that the political struggle between the main actors in the two administrative divisions (i.e. between the *umarā* and the *ulamā*) was the most significant political struggle in the emirate between 1908 and 1918. Moreover, in this struggle, die-hard *Qadims* and *Jadids* were merely the instruments of political actors with far more important political aims, i.e. their survival as the most powerful political actors in the emirate. I, thus, find it necessary to focus more on the *umarā* and especially the tensions among the higher echelons of the administration. Such tensions might demystify the *Qadims* and, along the way, also explain many of Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's political decisions and why he later came to denounce the *Jadids* so vehemently.

The second part of this paper is an inquiry into Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's personal convictions and his discursive opposition to *jadīdism*. Since the central political classifications in use in Bukhara during the 1910s dealt with time, i.e. *jadīd* (new) and *qadīm* (old), it seems worthwhile to focus on the conceptualisation of historical time. After all, the concept of progress was central to the *Jadīd* discourse; something stressed by Adeeb Khalid who frequently refers to the *Jadīd* discourse as 'the discourse on progress.'⁶ The *Jadids* clearly saw themselves as the promoters of progress, *Taraqqaiparvars*. However, the modern concept of progress was absent in pre-20th century Bukhara, and as the *Jadīd* discourse, to a large extent, was 'imported,'⁷ it seems possible to assume that those elements less prone to reforms (the *Qadims*) were more inclined to adhere to a discourse on 'non-progress.'

From the writings of those who sooner or later were classified as *Jadids*, we know that many, but probably not all of the *Jadids*,

⁶ See Khalid, *Jadidism* 107–113.

⁷ See Komatsu Hisao, "Bukhara and Istanbul. A Consideration about the background of the Munāzara," *Islam and Politics in Russia and Central Asia*, eds. Stéphane A. Dudoignon and Komatsu Hisao (London: Kegan Paul, 2001).

possessed modern concepts of historical time, and we also know that at least one prominent Bukharan *Jadīd*, 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Fīrat, accused his antagonists of not recognising the importance of making progress, saying that their acts would lead to a general decline, and that they had no idea that this 'time' was very different from others. He claimed that they did not recognise any temporalities other than the present and the hereafter, and that they were engaged in predicting the Last Day.⁸

As a matter of fact, Fīrat's account and later Soviet historiography are contradictory. What Fīrat in fact wrote was that the *Qadims* lacked modern concepts of historical time, while Soviet historiography frequently made the implicit claim that the *Qadims* possessed modern concepts of historical time but that they projected them in a diametrically opposite direction. The latter was very much in harmony with prevalent Eurocentric and ahistorical approaches in Soviet social sciences where the *Qadims* were not uncommonly classified as reactionaries living in the Middle Ages. In fact, without concepts like progress, regress, temporalities and con-temporalities, the whole ideological struggle between the *Jadids* and *Qadims* seems to lose its central terminology, at least in much of the Soviet historiography.⁹

As in all intense political struggles there was probably a profound semantic radicalisation and confusion in the tense political climate prevalent in Bukhara during the 1910s, especially against a background of fairly rapidly coined appearing modern political catchwords. Can we assume that we also had a discursive rupture in Bukhara at this time? If so, would it be reasonable to assume that this rupture was best

⁸ See Abduraufi Fīratī Bukhorī, "Robari Najot", *Sadoi Sharq* [Dushanbe] 9 (1992) 25, 35.

⁹ This division of the Bukharan Muslims in terms of progressive and reactionary elements were very much a part of the Russian discourse on Central Asia. The division became a part of the Soviet historiography at an early stage, like Fayzullāh Khwājaev who in his *Bukhoro Inqilobining Tarikhiga Materiallar* claimed that under the classification *jadīd* all promoters of progress could be gathered, while all the reactionaries were gathered under the classification *qadīm*. (Tashkent: Fan, 1997). Part of the problem is obviously also anchored in the careless attitude many researchers have shown in making a distinction between their research language and the language of those studied.

reflected by the various political factions' subscriptions to different concepts of historical time? Did the *Jadids* use modern concepts which were, in essence, time-producing, focusing on progress primarily achieved through human agency; while the *Qadims* used time-killing prophetic concepts, focusing on divine intervention and the end of the world? Was this the main difference between the discourse on progress and the prophetic discourse? In other words, was there any truth in Fiṭrat's above-mentioned claims, or were the *Qadims* rather deliberate reactionaries?

Another question arises from this which in many ways seems to be timeless; to what extent did this new discourse (in this case the discourse on progress) merely provide the traditional struggle for power with a new mode of expression? Let us begin this study with a description of the administration and of some of the main political actors in Bukhara between the Russian conquests (1869–1920) before we turn to the ups and downs of Mīrzā Salīm-bīk and his worldview.

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Patterns of Power and Poverty

The Political Arena

Roughly speaking, the Bukharan administration had two divisions; the fiscal and the judicial. As they theoretically made up a system of dual supervision, in which the emir was the only link,¹⁰ they aimed at being mutually exclusive in their recruitment basis. By tradition the fiscal division consisted of Uzbeks with a tribal lineage, although Shia of Iranian origin (*Irānī*) were later to gain considerable influence. The judicial administration was based on Islamic authority, and filled its ranks mainly from among Sunni Muslims devoid of any tribal lineage.

Advancement in the administration began with education, but was impossible without the support of high-ranking servants. For future servants in the fiscal administration a *madrassa* education was not obligatory. They frequently began their career as an apprentice for a high-level state servant, usually a provincial governor. If they were fortunate, they would later work as a *amlākdār* (governor of a small province), and later advance to the position of *hākim* (governor), first of small provinces then of larger ones. Longer stays together with the emir or the crown prince, at his court or on trips, would also be advantageous for one's career, as so would high appointments in the capital, like that of *mīrshab* (head of the police). The last position in the hierarchy would be that of the *qūshbīgī*, who was rather like a prime minister and one of the most important persons when it came to higher appointments in the fiscal administration. However, like in the judicial administration, the emir had to consent to all such appointments.

For the *‘ulamā*, servants in the judicial administration, a *madrassa* education was indispensable. For a successful career, they would begin to teach at an advanced level. Upon graduating they would be appointed *mudarris* (teacher) in a *madrassa* in the capital, and advance through the judicial hierarchy where, sooner or later, they would be appointed judge (*qāzī*) in various provinces. Hopefully they would eventually reach the position of *ra’īs*, which was the second rank after the chief judge, *qāzī-yi*

¹⁰ A.A. Semenov, *Ocherk* 32.

kalān, who was responsible for all higher appointments in the judicial administration.¹¹ However, if the *qāzī-yi kalān* was on a better footing with the emir, it is highly likely that he had a big say even in appointments in the fiscal administration. The case was obviously reversed if the *qūshbīgī* was more influential. Moreover, in order to secure one's power and reward one's supporters it was customary to appoint one's close relatives or supporters to positions around oneself.¹²

Russia tried to control her protectorate through two different institutions; one was the Governor-general in Tashkent who was subordinated to the Ministry of Defence, the other was the Russian Political Agency, subordinated to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs located in the Russian town of Kagan just outside the capital of the protectorate. Later the Political Agency had a police station in the old town of Bukhara which paid many an informer who came with far from reliable information. Thus Russia did not always know what was going on in the protectorate, and indeed, for the uninitiated observer the Bukharan political arena frequently appeared to be merely an uninstitutionalised chaos.

It seems as if the Russian authorities considered the *‘ulamā*, in particular, as a rather difficult group to control and one which rarely shared the same interests as Russia. The Russian authorities thus tried to secure influence over politics in the emirate through the *umarā*. Many of the prominent *umarā* had been to Russia and spoke Russian and had a good working relationship with the Russian authorities, whom they were also dependent on from a military point of view. It was, thus, both in the Russian authorities' and in the *umarās*' interests to have a weak *qāzī-yi kalān* and the *‘ulamā* subjugated to the fiscal administration. This was especially evident after the turn of the century.

¹¹ For a good account of the career of the Bukharan *‘ulamā*, see M.S. Yusupov, *Sud v Bukhare. Sudoustroĭstvo i sudoproizvodstvo v Bukharskom ėmirate v kontse XIX i nachale XX v.v.*, ms., Archive of the Museum of Art of Samarkand, inv. no. 827; 29–35, 39f. My description here is obviously oversimplified.

¹² See also O.A. Sukhareva, *Bukhara XIX – nachalo XX v. (Pozdnefeodaln'yi gorod i ego naselenie)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1966) 268f.

As the Russians and the *qūshbīgīs* had a common interest in having a *qāzī-yi kalān* subjugated to the *qūshbīgī*, the *qāzīs* had to rely on their own means to exert authority in tense political situations. Usually this was done by mobilising the *madrassa* students in the capital, something which not seldom led to riots.¹³ As *madrassa* students frequently stuck together with *mudarrises* from the same area of origin as themselves, such riots could take on regional significance, and it is here that we encounter the two best known 'student' factions in Bukhara, the *Tūmānīs* (from the areas around Bukhara), and the *Khatlānīs* (or *Kūhistānī*) from eastern Bukhara. However, the population around Bukhara could be successfully mobilised by the *qāzī* in the province and, thus, called to the city in tense political situations. These people did not by default side with the highest ranking *Tūmānī* in the capital, as the provincial *qāzī* (or any other regional authority) could be convinced that a *Khatlānī ra'īs* or *qāzī-yi kalān* was the person who, for the time being, best saw to his interests.¹⁴ Thus, one has thus to be very careful when interpreting such political conflicts in terms of regional belonging where very few actors are involved.

There seems to have been a constant lack of equilibrium between different political actors in the emirate, and the result was a constant struggle for promotion in the administration. Foreign actors frequently played an instrumental role in enhancing one's position, status, and influence. It was social drama full stop. Tensions between different persons burst, whereupon they were followed by a new mobilisation of political capital through the formation of alliances. There were several such cases during the protectorate era, but few of them were accompanied by large-scale violence.

¹³ In fact, as the *umarā* and their manpower did not stand a chance against Russia's military superiority, the power of the *‘ulamā* and their ability to mobilise their students in the capital became the main threat to Russia's control over the most important political arena in the emirate.

¹⁴ For such a case, see Sadriddin Aynī, *Tarikhi inqilobi Bukhoro* (Dushanbe: Adib, 1987) 159f, 177f.

Emir Muẓaffar's Men

The first of such crises during the period studied here did indeed lead to violence. This was at the time of the Russian conquest when emir Muẓaffar's (r. 1865–1885) forces were defeated, and other elements, most notably two of his sons, seized the opportunity and managed to get the support of most of the Uzbek tribal aristocracy and the higher echelons of the judicial administration. Lacking sufficient support from within the emirate, emir Muẓaffar followed an old tradition and allied himself with an outside actor, i.e. the Russians, who helped him quell the rebellion and regain his domestic supremacy. The price he paid was an imposed protectorate status which initially made itself most clearly felt in the realm of foreign affairs.

This period of unrest was followed by a period of administrative reshuffling of which the old maxim of 'divide and rule' was one of the more salient features. The old *ra'īs* was sent to a distant province. The *qāẓī-yi kalān*, Ṣadr al-Dīn (d. 1276/1879) from Khatlān in eastern Bukhara, who probably had remained loyal to the emir during the rebellion, expelled 14 more of the most prominent *‘ulamā*,¹⁵ and probably replacing them with his own men. The situation in the fiscal administration was somewhat similar; the relatives of the emir and rebellious tribal leaders were killed or imprisoned, and many were probably replaced by *Irānīs*.¹⁶ The *qūshbīgīs* in the capital from the time of emir Naṣrullāh (r. 1826–1860) until the end of ‘Abd al-Aḥad's (r. 1885–1910) rule came from a single *Irānī* family.

Among those expelled from the capital was a prominent Bukharan *‘ālim* (Muslim scholar), ‘Abd al-Shukūr (d. 1306/1888–1889), who lost his position as *ra'īs* and then began to serve as *qāẓī* in various provinces. With him two of his sons also fell out of favor; one of them was even imprisoned on charges of murder.¹⁷ We can but speculate that this event triggered off a readjustment of political forces in the emirate and

¹⁵ Muḥammad Sharīfjān Makhdūm, *Tarjuma-yi aḥval-i ḥaẓrat-i vālidam āba tharrāhū ū ābā ū ajdādishān*, ms., al-Biruni Institute of Oriental Sciences of the Academy of Science of the Republic of Uzbekistan (henceforth IVAN Uz.) inv. no. 1304, 112ab.

¹⁶ Ṣadr al-Dīn ‘Aynī, *Tā'rīkh-i amīrān-i Manghūtiya-yi Bukhārā* (Tashkent: Turkestanское Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1923) 50–77.

¹⁷ Sharīfjān Makhdūm, *Tarjuma-yi* 108b.

the emergence of new political formations aimed at regaining lost power. Some time before the death of *qāẓī-yi kalān* Ṣadr al-Dīn, more than a dozen *‘ulamā* in unfavourable positions, i.e. deposed or serving in rather distant provinces, met with ‘Abd al-Shukūr in Qarshi,¹⁸ the heartland of the Manghūts. ‘Abd al-Shukūr was eventually able to mobilize enough political capital, and succeeded Ṣadr al-Dīn as *qāẓī-yi kalān*, while Ṣadr al-Dīn's son, Badr al-Dīn (d. 1908), eventually succeeded ‘Abd al-Shukūr.

Although theoretically separate, the *qūshbīgī* and the *qāẓī-yi kalān* were never equal in terms of strength or in their influence over the emir. Ṣadr al-Dīn and Badr al-Dīn are generally considered to have been stronger than their fiscal equivalents. Tensions between the *qāẓīs* and the *ḥākims* permeated the whole administration. In the capital, the mightier of them was the one who enjoyed the best relationship with the emir, while the provincial *qāẓīs* and *ḥākims* were very dependent on their supporters in the capital. This does not mean that they were constantly at loggerheads with each other. It seems plausible that they frequently reached a modus operandi if both the *qāẓī*'s and the *ḥākīm*'s supporters in the capital possessed more or less the same amount of political capital. However, it was common that the *qāẓīs* in the *vilāyats* (provinces) were subordinate to the *ḥākims*, while the *amlākdārs* (i.e. the governors in the districts around Bukhara [*tūmāns*]) were subordinate to the *qāẓīs*.¹⁹

The appearance of *jadīdism* and the call for reform in Bukhara are closely tied to the period between 1905 and 1910, and to events taking place on the global political scene, mainly the activities among Russia's Tatars, the Young Turks' activities in Istanbul, the Constitutional Revolution in Iran, and the first political experiences of Russia's Muslims after the first Russian Revolution in 1905. However, the political arena in Bukhara also witnessed two important events usually overlooked by contemporary historians. One was the death of *qāẓī-yi kalān*

¹⁸ Sharīfjān Makhdūm, *Tarjuma-yi* 112ab.

¹⁹ Yusupov, *Sud* 42. From this it follows that the highest ranking servants in the judicial administration were centered in and around Bukhara. For servants in the fiscal administration more distant provinces such as Charjou and Shahrīsabz were much more prestigious than a small *tūmān* outside Bukhara.

Badr al-Dīn (d. 1908), the other was the death of the *hākīm* of Hissar, Āstānaqul-bī bin ʿAbbās-bī (d. 1906). The latter is mainly remembered for his long term in office as *hākīm* over Hissar, where he served for some 20 years until his death. He was a childhood friend of emir Muẓaffar, and some sources even claim that he was his half brother.²⁰ Beyond doubt, he was the most influential person in eastern Bukhara, which basically was his domain, but he enjoyed enormous respect in the rest of the emirate, too. He went to Russia several times with the crown prince ʿAbd al-Aḥad, whom he tried to influence in order to promote his interests in the emirate. However, he eventually lost this battle to a prominent *Irānī* family headed by the *qūshbīgī* Jān Mīrzā²¹ (d. 1905 or 1906), which is probably why he ended up in distant Hissar and was repeatedly denied permission to return to the capital. However, the remoteness of Hissar did not hinder him from subscribing to Russian newspapers which were sent to him on a regular basis even before the turn of the century,²² nor did it stop him from establishing several *vaqfs* (religious foundations) in Medina,²³ nor from being the patron of many prominent *umarā*. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, as well as his arch-enemy, Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, had begun their careers as apprentices for Āstānaqul-bī bin ʿAbbās-bī.²⁴

²⁰ *Turkestan'skiya Vedomosti*, "Astanaqul'-bik' Kushbegi. Bek gissarskiĭ" [Tashkent] 114 (28 July 1906); Semenov, *Ocherk* 54 n.1.

²¹ Gholib Ghoibov, *Ta'rikhi Hisorī Shodmon, Chaghoniyo va Dushanbe (Ta'rikhi siyosī va jughrofiyoi ta'rikhi Vodii Hisor az asri VIII to soli 1921)* (Dushanbe: Amri ilm, 1999) 153.

²² A. Semenov, *Na Rubezhe Afganistana: I. V Blagodatnom Khissare (Putevye ocherki)* (Moscow: Tovarishchestva I.N. Kushkerekov i Ko, 1900) 6.

²³ Gholib Ghoibov, *Ta'rikhi* 154.

²⁴ For the latter, see Fitrat, *Davrai* 26; for Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, see below.

Between the Russian Revolutions

The death of the *hākīm* of Hissar seems to have caused a vast amount of power to be concentrated in the hands of the *Irānī qūshbīgī*,²⁵ Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf bin Jān Mīrzā (d. 1923). The death of the *qāzī-yi kalān* from Khatlan about two years later allowed him to concentrate even more power in his hands.²⁶ These two deaths must, as a consequence, have called for a considerable readjustment of the political forces in the emirate,²⁷ especially since emir ʿAbd al-Aḥad died in 1910.

Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf was able to appoint the weak and old Baqā Khwāja as *qāzī-yi kalān*. He obviously did not fear him. Thus we have a situation in which a strong *Irānī qūshbīgī* controls a weak *qāzī-yi kalān* who was not from Ṣadr al-Dīn's family. Here was the source of a common interest between Badr al-Dīn's son, Burhān al-Dīn (d. 1920), the *ra'īs* who had the ambition to succeed his father, and ambitious political actors among the Uzbek *umarā* who had been excluded from the top echelons of power in the capital since well before the Russian conquest.²⁸ The moment was also opportune for other reasons; the emir was old and apparently fairly disinterested in the politics of the emirate, and the crown prince, ʿĀlim Khān (emir 1910–1920, d. 1944), is hardly remembered for his political talents.²⁹

²⁵ It seems implausible to claim, as G. Tsviling did, i.e. that it was the death of Jān Mīrzā, in other words his father, which was one of the most important factors. See G. Tsviling, "Bukharskaya smuta (9 ianv. 1910 g.)," *Srednyaya Aziya* [Tashkent] 2 (1910): 79.

²⁶ Aynī, *Tarikh* 44.

²⁷ Sami claims that they were the most influential people in the emirate. See Mirza Abdal Azim Sami, *Ta'rikh-i Salatin-i Mangitiia*, ed. and trans. by A.M. Ėpifanova (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Vostochnoi Literatury, 1962) 119bf. (trans. 122f.) He also describes his advancement under emir Muẓaffar, praises him for his influence, his role in the foreign affairs of the emirate, etc. 123bf. (trans. 125).

²⁸ According to some sources Uzbek *umarā*, already in the second half of the 19th century, had tried to sow the seeds of ethnic discord between the Shia and Sunnis in the capital in order to promote their interests. See T.G. Tukhtametov, *Russko-Bukharskie otnosheniya v kontse XIX-nachale XX v. ipobeda Bukharskoĭ narodnoĭ revolyutsii* (Tashkent: Fan, 1966) 84.

²⁹ The Russian authorities considered ʿĀlim Khān to have a fickle character at least as early as 1910. See B. Kh. Ėrgashev, "Iz istorii obshchestvenno-

Burhān al-Dīn, the late Badr al-Dīn's son, considered himself to be next in line for the position of *qāzī-yi kalān*. One of the two main objectives was to make sure that the all-powerful *qūshbīgī*, the *Irānī* Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf, would not jeopardize Burhān al-Dīn's ambitions.³⁰ The second was linked to the first: the sooner *qāzī-yi kalān* Baqā Khwāja lost his power the better. Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf's support for the *Jadīds* and the new-method schools,³¹ which were viewed with suspicion by the majority of *ʿulamā*, became the key issue in a political debate from which Burhān al-Dīn emerged as a fierce opponent of these very schools.³² However, his main strategy was as old as it was efficient, mobilising popular support by causing ethnic animosity.³³ The riots, which were triggered in early 1910 by an assault on a *mullabachcha* (student) who had ridiculed a group of *Irānīs* during the *ʿĀshūrā*, lasted for several days and resulted in many casualties. Two *mudarris* from Kokand played a key role in mobilising their *mullabachchas*; their students (many of whom were from the Ferghana valley), as well as students from Khatlan (supporters of Burhān al-Dīn), are commonly believed to have been responsible for triggering off the riots. However, the rioters probably also included students from the *tūmāns*, since resentment towards the Shia could be activated in all camps.

The emir refused to leave his residence in Kermine, and initially sent both the *ḥākim* of Charjou and the *ḥākim* of Shahrisabz to assist the *qūshbīgī* in the capital. However, as both of them had their eyes on the post of *qūshbīgī*, their presence did

politicheskoi zhizni Bukhary nachala XX veka," *Obshchestvennye Nauki v Uzbekistane* [Tashkent] 2 (1992): 50f.

³⁰ See also Fitrat, *Davrai* 19.

³¹ That Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf was in favor of reforms and supported the new-method schools is frequently mentioned by the *Jadīds*. However, he played the same game as the other *ḥākims*. When the Russians pushed for administrative reforms in 1914, Naṣrullāh *qūshbīgī* abolished feeding in the *amlākdārs* around Bukhara and instated salaries. Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf, who served there at the time, emerged as a staunch opponent of these reforms. (Tukhtametov, *Russko-Bukharskie* 28).

³² An excellent account of this is to be found in Khalid, "Society".

³³ Burhān al-Dīn seems to have felt threatened by Āstānaqul. The former thus used religious anti-reform zealots in order to mobilize the *mullabachchas* and get rid of Āstānaqul. For this, see Aynī's and Fitrat's accounts. (Aynī, *Tarikhi* 44–47, 58f; Fitrat, *Davrai* 19f.).

nothing but paralyse the situation. The *qūshbīgī*, Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf, was eventually forced to call for military support from Tashkent. However, his fall was inevitable and he was replaced by the *ḥākim* of Shahrisabz, Mīrzā Naṣrullāh (d. 1918), while the *ḥākim* of Charjou, Nizām al-Dīn Ūrganchī (d. 1920), became the lower *qūshbīgī* (*qūshbīgī-yi payān*).

Burhān al-Dīn was the only *ʿālim* who met up with the crown prince ʿĀlim Khān when the latter came to Bukhara during the Sunni-Shia riots, and he was also the most important figure in the talks between the two religious communities and the Russian representative.³⁴ He did not reach his much aspired to position, however, probably because the new *qūshbīgī* feared his influence over the crown prince and the future emir ʿĀlim Khān,³⁵ and thus saw him as an unwanted person in the post of *qāzī-yi kalān*. Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf and the Shia were given most of the blame for the riots, while Baqā Khwāja, although labelled as a 'reactionary' in some Russian sources,³⁶ was considered old and innocent. So, although Burhān al-Dīn had tried to form an alliance with Mīrzā Naṣrullāh before the riots,³⁷ he was blamed by the emir for the riots and was the first to be sent to Kermine,³⁸ and then appointed *qāzī*, first in Ghijdovan,³⁹ and then in Charjou.⁴⁰ This was obviously of benefit to the new *qūshbīgī*, Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, who could continue to rule like Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf, i.e. not fearing the power of the *qāzī-yi kalān*. It was obviously also in the interests of Russia.

Burhān al-Dīn had, thus, to begin to mobilise political capital again, and eventually after a great *tūy* (feast) in honour of the emir, whom he also had lobbied in Kermine, he was appointed *qāzī-yi kalān* in 1914.⁴¹ However, since Mīrzā Naṣrullāh was still more powerful than Burhān al-Dīn, the conflict between them persisted. The former had to retain the support of the

³⁴ E.P. "Bukharskaya smuta," *Novoe Vremya* [Moscow] 12165 (1910): 15.

³⁵ For this, see Aynī, *Tarikhi* 82f; Fitrat, *Davrai* 27.

³⁶ E.P. "Bukharskaya": 11.

³⁷ Aynī, *Tarikhi* 46.

³⁸ Aynī, *Tarikhi* 83.

³⁹ Tsentral'nyi gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Respubliki Uzbekistan (henceforth TsGARUZ), f. i–3, op. 2, d. 264, l. 6ob.

⁴⁰ Fitrat, *Davrai* 28.

⁴¹ Fitrat, *Davrai* 30.

Russians while countering the influence of Burhān al-Dīn. Mīrzā Naṣrullāh thus drew his allies from those *‘ulamā* who were most hostile to Burhān al-Dīn. The former obviously came from Baqā Khwāja's and ‘Abd al-Shukūr's families and their allies, many of whom were so-called *Jadīds*. In order to discredit his rivals among the *‘ulamā* and Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, Burhān al-Dīn begun his new job by pushing through a ban on the new-method schools. These were schools which were mainly supported by his opponents, including the *Jadīds*, and considered suspicious and possibly ‘un-Islamic’ by many *‘ulamā*. Mīrzā Naṣrullāh had Burhān al-Dīn's role in the Sunni-Shia riots fresh in mind and did not dare to challenge him now. Moreover, with the outbreak of the First World War and the links between the *Jadīds* and Turkey, he was unlikely to gain Russian support in challenging Burhān al-Dīn over the school issue. It thus seems as if the *qūshbīgī* and the *qāzī-yi kalān* reached something of a modus operandi after this.

The February Revolution

This superficial harmony was soon to disappear in the aftermath of the Russian February Revolution in 1917 when Mīrzā Naṣrullāh *qūshbīgī* found a good opportunity to get rid of the *qāzī-yi kalān*, Burhān al-Dīn. Mīrzā Naṣrullāh probably calculated that backing from Russia was necessary in order to reduce the power of the Burhān al-Dīn, and thus gave at least vocal support for reforms which were called for by the *Jadīds* and supported by the new Russian administration after the February Revolution. Although officially against reforms, Burhān al-Dīn was aware of the necessity of Russia's support in order to remain in power; in personal talks with the chief of the Russian Political Agency in Kagan he thus assured the latter of his support for reforms.⁴²

Still, Burhān al-Dīn did not get Russian backing, and ‘Abd al-Shukūr's son, Sharīfjān Makhdūm, eventually replaced him, supported by the new Russian administration. This obviously favoured Mīrzā Naṣrullāh who had now got rid of the rather demanding Burhān al-Dīn and replaced him with a relatively weak *‘ālim* in the position of *qāzī-yi kalān*. Mīrzā Naṣrullāh maintained his good relations with the Political Agency in Kagan, while backing his calls for reforms in the emirate,⁴³ probably due, primarily, to the resistance of the majority of the *‘ulamā*, but perhaps also due to the fear that his own power risked being undermined.⁴⁴ Nevertheless, despite a substantial reshuffle in the judicial administration, the *qūshbīgī* and the Russian Political Agency in Kagan lost control over the whole situation, mainly because Burhān al-Dīn had successfully

⁴² Aynī, *Tarikhi* 145f.

⁴³ Aynī, *Tarikhi* 148ff. Here it is very interesting to read that the friendship between the *Jadīds* and the *Irānī* intensified during this time, something which gives rise to the question of whether the *Jadīds* now, after having lost Mīrzā Naṣrullāh *qūshbīgī*'s support, hoped to replace him with an *Irānī*. There had been rumours circulating in Bukhara about reinstating Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf since 1910 (see TsGARUz, f. i-3, op. 2, d. 161) in order to counter Burhān al-Dīn whose appointment as *qāzī-yi kalān* in 1914 seems to have come as a surprise for the Russian authorities who considered that their position in the emirate had become weaker. (See TsGARUz, f. i-3, op. 2, d. 264).

⁴⁴ See also Aynī, *Tarikhi* 158.

mobilised enough political capital and was probably supported by the majority of the *‘ulamā*. New disturbances erupted in Bukhara, some of the *Jadīds* were imprisoned, others were killed.

The reason for the loss of control was also partly to be found in the alliance between Mīrzā Naṣrullāh's old rival since 1910 for the position of *qūshbīgī*, Nizām al-Dīn Ūrganchī,⁴⁵ and Burhān al-Dīn. The former had continued to mobilise political capital in order to promote his own position, and a natural ally for him was obviously Burhān al-Dīn. They thus both emerged as vocal opponents of reforms in the emirate immediately after the February Revolution in 1917. However, Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, supported by Russia, still possessed enough political capital to counter Burhān al-Dīn, who was dismissed and sent to Qarshi. Nevertheless, after the bloody crackdown on the *Jadīds* after the proclamation of reforms in April of that same year, Mīrzā Naṣrullāh was severely discredited as he had inverted too much political capital into the reforms and the *Jadīds* in order to counter the influence of Burhān al-Dīn. The latter eventually managed to return to Bukhara, where, for some time, the unclear situation forced Mīrzā Naṣrullāh to play a double game, claiming both to share the interests of the reformers and those of the conservatives.⁴⁶ In the end, Nizām al-Dīn Ūrganchī replaced Naṣrullāh and took over the post of *qūshbīgī*. Sharīfjān Makhdūm was replaced by Burhān al-Dīn after only three months as *qāzī-yi kalān*. This was the beginning of a much more troublesome period in the Russo-Bukharan relationship when Russian influence drastically waned. Bukhara was even recognised as an independent country. Those who had been most dependent upon Russia's support thus lost most. The *Tūmānī ‘ulamā* and the *Jadīds* lost almost all their influence.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ His case seems to prove that even the *Irānī umarā* promoted Uzbek *umarā*. If I understand Fitrat rightly, then Ūrganchī began his career under a certain Mullā Ḥusayn Dīvānbīgī (Fitrat, *Davrai* 31).

⁴⁶ Aynī, *Tarikhi*, 144f, 187.

⁴⁷ Moreover, Nizām al-Dīn Ūrganchī was replaced by ‘Uthmān-bīk (d.1920) after less than a year, when he again was appointed lower *qūshbīgī*. ‘Uthmān-bīk was an old friend of ‘Ālim Khān. He had been de facto ruler of Qarshi when the latter was *hākīm* there around the turn of the century. (Fitrat, *Davrai* 7.) Nizām al-Dīn Ūrganchī died while fleeing from the Bolsheviks in 1920. (Muḥammad ‘Alī ibn Muḥammad Sayyid

Shortly after the February Revolution, two prominent Bukharan *Jadīds* left for Russia to seek the support of the provisional government.⁴⁸ Support from Russia was also to be sought in Kagan and later in Tashkent, where the most ambitious of those who had been forced to flee during the repression of the *Jadīds* and Burhān al-Dīn's foes, established contact with the Bolsheviks, probably propelled by the same logic as emir Muẓaffar some 50 years earlier, which had led to his successful re-entry as the most powerful actor on the political scene in Bukhara. In 1918, some of Burhān al-Dīn's opponents led by Fayẓullāh Khwājaev, the son of a rich Bukharan merchant, allied themselves with the chairman of the Tashkent Soviet, Fyodor Kolesov, and tried to dash Bukhara, an attempt which failed. Finally, in 1920, Mikhail Frunze accompanied by the *Jadīds* and their Bukharan allies invaded Bukhara and deposed the emir who fled to Afghanistan. Unlike emir Muẓaffar, the *Jadīds* and their Bukharan allies were never able to become the most powerful political actors in Bukhara. Eventually they lost everything.⁴⁹

Baljuvānī, *Tā'rīkh-i Nafī'ī*, ed. Ahror Mukhtorov [Dushanbe: Irfon, 1994] 64).

⁴⁸ Aynī, *Tarikhi* 150.

⁴⁹ It comes as no surprise that Burhān al-Dīn and his prime allies were the first major losers of the Red Army invasion in 1920. He and many others were executed, including the *qūshbīgī*, while the old friends of ‘Abd al-Shukūr's family got positions in the newly proclaimed People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara, especially in the Ministry of Enlightenment, at the time, headed by the prominent Bukharan *Jadīd* ‘Abd al-Ra'ūf Fiṭrat. However, the real power was immediately transferred to the All Bukharan Extraordinary Dictatorian Commission whose executive branch was dominated by non-Bukharans. (See Akhmed Saidgireevich Subkhankulov, *Vospominanie*, ms kept in the Museum of the Ark of Bukhara, inv. no. 20315/11-5).

A Short Biography of Mīrzā Salīm-bīk

Mīrzā Muḥammad Salīm-bīk bin Muḥammad Raḥīm-bīk was the oldest son in a family that had held high administrative positions in the emirate of Bukhara for at least two generations. He was probably born in Bukhara in 1848 or 1850.⁵⁰ His father died when he was eight years old, which must have been at the time when he was studying in the *maktab*. At the age of 22 his paternal uncle, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz-bī bin ʿĀlim-bīk-bī Dādkhwāh, wrote him a letter of recommendation and sent him to serve the influential Āstānaqul-bī bin ʿAbbās-bī, who had just been transferred from *amlākdār* of Ghijdovan to *ḥākim* of Zīya al-Dīn *vilāyat*.⁵¹ After six months Āstānaqul-bī bin ʿAbbās-bī, on the order of emir Muẓaffar, sent Salīm-bīk to Tashkent, which recently had been conquered by the Russians, where he was supposed to keep an eye on the Russians and their activities.⁵² He spent some 12 years in Tashkent, working as the trade agent to the emirate. He returned every sixth months to report back to the emir.⁵³ During this time he also represented Bukhara politically on several occasions, as did Mīrzā Naṣrullāh.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk married twice in Tashkent. His first wife, a Tatar, died after one year of marriage. He returned to Bukhara

⁵⁰ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's son claims that he was born in 1848. (Salimi Ughli, Muḥammad Raḥīm Muḥammad Salīm, unnamed ms dated July 1965, 33 pages. Kept in the personal library of Naim Norkulov, Tashkent, p.1). Semenov claims that he was born in 1850. (Semenov, *Bukharskii* 1).

⁵¹ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī*, ms., IVAN Uz, inv. no. 2016, 69b. See also Semenov, *Bukharskii* 1. However, according to Salimi Ughli, it was a relative by the name of Maḥmūd-bīk who wrote the letter of recommendation and sent Salīm-bīk to serve Āstānaqul-bī bin ʿAbbās-bī in Zīyā al-Dīn *vilāyat*. (Salimi Ughli, 1). Before this the same author claims that Salīm-bīk had been working for two years in the pharmacists' bazaar in Bukhara.

⁵² Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 70b. Salimi Ughli claims that Salīm-bīk worked for some years in Zīyā al-Dīn, and then worked for him in Shahrīsabz and in Hissar before he went to Tashkent. (Salimi Ughli, 1f.).

⁵³ Norkulov, *'Tarikh-i Salimi' - tsennyi* 7. Semenov similarly claims that he spent 12 years in Tashkent (Semenov, *Bukharskii* 2), while Salimi Ughli claims that he spent 11 years there (Salimi Ughli, 2). Unfortunately little is known about his stay in Tashkent, a period which must have been one of the most formative in his life. It is clear that he was well acquainted with both the Russian authorities and the traditional elite. (See Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 71a).

with his second wife and the small fortune he had made in Tashkent.⁵⁴ Back in Bukhara, he was soon appointed *amlākdār* in Khoftar and Samjin *tūmāns*, two small provinces around Bukhara (1303/1885–86 – 1306/1888–89), and during this time, together with the crown prince, he also went to St. Petersburg, where he spent 62 days.⁵⁵ In 1306/1888–89 he was appointed *mīrshab*, and then got the title *tuqsābī* (chief of a small military unit).⁵⁶ During his years as *mīrshab* he had a *madrasa* built in the *Masjid-i Buland maḥalla*.⁵⁷ The *madrasa* was supported by a *vaqf* he also founded. The basis of the *vaqf* was some stalls (*rasta*) in a bazaar and land previously owned by him. His charitable activities also involved voluminous book donations to mosques and students. Next to the *Imām*-gate in Bukhara he even had a house built for blind people.⁵⁸

In 1311/1893–94 he was appointed *ḥākim* in Yakkahbagh *vilāyat*. Thereafter he was appointed *ḥākim* in Nurata *vilāyat* (1316/1898–99) where he had the shrine of a certain shaykh ʿAbd al-Ḥasan Nūrī renovated. In order to maintain it, he founded a *vaqf* consisting of stalls in the bazaar. In 1320/1902–03 he was appointed *ḥākim* of Baysun. However, he fell ill and was forced to return to Bukhara where he spent another year before being sent to Shirabad (1324/1906–07), and then to Shahrīsabz (1328/1910). Due to an argument with the *qūshbīgī*, Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, he was dismissed from this position in 1332/1913–14, and returned to Bukhara where he continued his career following Ramadan 1335/1916, being promoted to *parvānachī* (a title of honour) and *zakāṭchī-yi kalan* (chief tax

⁵⁴ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 70b.

⁵⁵ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī va ta'rikh-i mutaqaḍdimīn va muta'akhirrīn* (Tashkent: Gulam' Khasan' Arifjanov, 1333/1914) 274.

⁵⁶ According to Salimi Ughli's account, which is fairly apologetic, Mīrzā Salīm-bīk did not want to have this position, but wanted to go on *hajj*, which the emir did not allow. (Salimi Ughli, 2f.).

⁵⁷ It is very possible that this is the *madrasa* O.A. Sukhareva mentions in her *Kvartal'naya obshchina pozdnefeodal'nogo goroda Bukhary (v svyazi s istorei kvartalov)* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976) 157. According to her, it consisted of only eight cells, and thus seems to have served as a dormitory rather than as a place of instruction.

⁵⁸ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 99bf.

collector),⁵⁹ and eventually replaced Nizām al-Dīn Ūganchī. The Russian authorities, which in 1917 were increasingly displeased with the present *qūshbīgī* and his failure to control the *‘ulamā*, even discussed with the emir the possibility of making Mīrzā Salīm-bīk the new *qūshbīgī*.⁶⁰

In March 1918 Mīrzā Salīm-bīk led the emir's forces against the first Soviet attempt to seize Bukhara. Thereafter he headed the Bukharan delegation in the peace negotiations with the Bolsheviks in Qiziltepa.⁶¹ A year later he was sent to Tashkent to carry out negotiations concerning the water shortage in Bukhara,⁶² and was shocked by the devastation brought about by the Bolsheviks.⁶³ In March 1920 he was dismissed as lower *qūshbīgī* and head of the tax-collection, and appointed *hākīm* in the wealthy province of Charjou, where he was arrested by the Bolsheviks on the 29th August, 1920, i.e. a few days before the actual invasion of Bukhara. Thereupon he was sent to Siberia, but it is unclear whether he actually got so far. His son writes that Mīrzā Salīm-bīk spent some five months on a train before coming back to Bukhara where he was kept in a house close to the former emir's palace outside the town, and later interned in Nizām al-Dīn Ūganchī's house in Bukhara, which served as a prison.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk was set free in April 1921 and settled with his family in Bukhara. Soon he was called upon to work in the administration of the recently proclaimed People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara where he was appointed vice director of the *zakāt*-department of the Ministry of Finance. The director of this department was none other than the old *qūshbīgī*, Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf.⁶⁴ Salīm-bīk also worked in the *vaqf*-administration under the Ministry of Enlightenment. Here he

⁵⁹ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 112a–129b. His son claims that he was appointed in the town of Nurata, but does not mention what he did there, other than that he became very ill. (Salimi Ughli, 3).

⁶⁰ TsGARUZ, f. 3, op. 2, d. 513, l. 194. Published in V. V. Adoratskiĭ, V. V. Maksakov, M. N. Pokrovskiĭ, V. P. Polonskiĭ, V. M. Friche, eds. *Krasnyi Arkhiv*, Vol. 1 (Moscow and Leningrad: Gosudarstvennoe Izdatel'stvo, 1927) 119f. Many thanks to Shimada Shizuo for these references.

⁶¹ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 153a–162b.

⁶² Salimi Ughli, 14f.

⁶³ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 229b.

⁶⁴ Salimi Ughli, 19–25.

worked in a library, and was also a member of the committee for the preservation of old monuments, arts, and nature, and contributed to the compilation of the history of the citadel (*Ark*) of Bukhara.⁶⁵ However, he spent the years after the fall of the emirate in dire financial straits. Not only was his property confiscated,⁶⁶ but he also lost his supporters and allies, especially after the first two years of the People's Republic when Moscow strengthened its grip on Bukhara. Nevertheless, he continued to work in the administration until both the *vaqf*-administration and the *zakāt*-department were abolished. He turned blind sometime before the national-territorial delimitation in 1924, and was never imprisoned or prosecuted again. He even received a state pension until his death in 1930.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Semenov, *Bukharskiĭ* 41.

⁶⁶ Hājī Ni'matullāh Muḥtaram, *Tadhkira-yi Muḥtaram*, ms., IVAN Uz., inv. no. 2252, 115a.

⁶⁷ Interview with Naim Norkulov on 23rd of September, 2001. Salīm-bīk's son claims that he died in March 1930 (Salimi Ughli, 27f.), while Semenov writes that he died in 1929. (Semenov, *Bukharskiĭ* 41).

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk and the *Umarā*

We do not know from where Mīrzā Salīm-bīk originated, but he did as early as 1911 consider himself as an Uzbek.⁶⁸ This, and his career in the fiscal administration, probably determined his rise to power and, thus, his solidarity networks more than anything else. As one of the *umarā* and as an Uzbek, Salīm-bīk's struggle for power took place in another arena than that in which most of the *ulamā* in Bukhara fought. He could not mobilise the *madrassa*-students, the *mullabachchas*, and he never had the intention or the possibility of becoming *qāzī-yi kalān*. Instead he aimed at becoming the *qūshbīgī*, head of the fiscal administration. Salīm-bīk could thus enter into temporal alliances with any one of the *ulamā* in order to improve his position among the *umarā*, something which obviously was most easily done when he was in the capital itself, as he, as an ambulating servant in the fiscal administration, was usually too far away from Bukhara to be able to actively participate in the most important political affairs in the emirate.

The dispersion of sources makes Salīm-bīk's allies and thus his networks among the *umarā* rather difficult to map. Even the fact that he was an Uzbek and not an *Irānī* does not necessarily say anything about his loyalties. In fact, he did not write much about the Sunni-Shia clashes in Bukhara in 1910, and he seems only to have become increasingly hostile to the Shia after 1917, when the Shia, *Jadīds*, *Tūmānīs*, and the Jews, to a certain degree, joined arms against their opponents, i.e. the *Khattānīs*, the *Ferghānas*, and possibly some of the Uzbek *umarā*.⁶⁹

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's career begun when his family sent him to serve Āstānaqul-bī bin ʿAbbās-bī during the 1870s, and his (temporary) fall began when Mīrzā Naṣrullāh became *qūshbīgī* a few years after the death of Āstānaqul-bī. Although further evidence is lacking, it seems reasonable to assume that ✓ Āstānaqul-bī was instrumental to Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's career, as he probably was for Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, and many other Uzbek *umarā*, and perhaps even *Irānī*. It is interesting to note that

⁶⁸ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, *Aḥādīth al-aʿmāl* (Bukhara: Mullā Sulṭān Bukhārī, 1330/1911–1912) 144.

⁶⁹ These ethnonyms do not signify anything other than that *mullabachchas* and their teachers originating in these regions.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk probably neither benefited from his death, nor from the fall of the Shia *qūshbīgī*, Āstānaqul bin Muḥammadsharīf, who, as mentioned above, was disposed of after the clashes between the Sunnis and the Shia in Bukhara in 1910 and later became his chief in the *zakāt*-department in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara. Although the new *qūshbīgī*, Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, just like Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, had begun his career working for Āstānaqul-bī ʿAbbās-bī, the latter's death apparently only intensified their animosity. In fact Mīrzā Naṣrullāh seems to have been a long-term rival of Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, and their power struggle had already begun under emir Muḥaffar. In Salīm-bīk's *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* we can see the first traces of this conflict when the emir first wanted Salīm-bīk to go to St. Petersburg together with the crown prince, ʿAbd al-Aḥad, but promoted Mīrzā Naṣrullāh from *mīrakhūr* to *tuqsābī* (i.e. bestowed him a higher title of honour), and sent him in his place.⁷⁰ The conflict between them escalated when Mīrzā Naṣrullāh dismissed Salīm-bīk from his position as *ḥākim* over Shahrīsabz in 1332/1913–14 on charges of mismanagement.⁷¹

Salīm-bīk ultimately got his revenge, and was, at least in his own opinion, one of the key persons in Mīrzā Naṣrullāh's ousting in 1917.⁷² Mīrzā Salīm-bīk probably cooperated with Burhān al-Dīn in order to promote his own position, which he did very successfully. He actually reached the peak of his career during this period; he was, together with Burhān al-Dīn and ʿAbd al-Raʿūf bin Kārvānbāshī, entrusted with the task of negotiating peace with the Bolsheviks in Kagan after Kolesov's failed invasion of Bukhara in 1918,⁷³ and was appointed *zakāṭchī-yi kalān*, and then *ḥākim* of the wealthy province of Charjou.

⁷⁰ Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i* 287.

⁷¹ According to Salīm-bīk this was triggered off by a conflict in the bazaar. (Salīm-bīk, *Taʾrīkh-i Salīmī* 126a).

⁷² Salīm-bīk, *Taʾrīkh-i Salīmī* 130b–133b.

⁷³ Salīm-bīk, *Taʾrīkh-i Salīmī* 168b.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk and the 'Ulamā

It is worth noting that Mīrzā Salīm-bīk never criticised anyone among the prominent Bukharan 'ulamā, at least not in the sources referred to here. This is probably a testimony of his political strategy; he could not risk losing political capital in his quest for a high position in the fiscal administration by getting on the wrong side of any 'ālim. He is almost totally neutral with regard to Burhān al-Dīn and his relatives, about whom he never wrote a single bad word, nor a good one for that matter. However, one qāzī-yi kalān he held in high esteem was 'Abd al-Shukūr, whom he described in very positive words.⁷⁴ Salīm-bīk was appointed *mīrshab* when 'Abd al-Shukūr served as qāzī-yi kalān, and Salīm-bīk obviously admired him. 'Abd al-Shukūr died the same year as Salīm-bīk was appointed, i.e. in 1306/1888–89, and was succeeded by Badr al-Dīn. The relationship between the latter and Salīm-bīk is not mentioned. However, the reason for his next stay in Bukhara, i.e. sometime around 1905, was due to a dispute with the qāzī of Baysun, where Salīm-bīk at the time was *hākim*. The qāzī in question was a certain Sirāj al-Dīn, possibly the brother of the Badr al-Dīn.⁷⁵ Salīm-bīk's next extended stay in Bukhara was after he had been deposed as *hākim* in Shahrisabz. This coincided with Burhān al-Dīn's appointment as qāzī-yi kalān and thus another phase of the political struggle between the latter and Mīrzā Naṣrullāh.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's resentment towards the new-method schools and the *Jadīds* is mainly voiced in his memoirs, which were completed in 1920 and written after the Russian revolution with its severe economic and political consequences for Bukhara which compromised the *Jadīds* due to their links with the Bolsheviks, especially after Kolesov's abortive attack in 1918. These circumstances probably explain much of the resentment towards the *Jadīds* in this work, but not all of it. Another

⁷⁴ Salīm-bīk was appointed *mīrshab* in Bukhara when 'Abd al-Shukūr was qāzī-yi kalān. (Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 102a–104a).

⁷⁵ This must have been a typical case when the *hākim* was subjugated to the qāzī. Salīm-bīk only mentions this conflict very briefly. (Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 114b.) His son, possibly having a rather weak memory when writing down his memories of his father in 1965, claims that the dispute was with the qāzī of Nurata, a certain Tāj al-Dīn, who wanted to get rid of the *hākim*. (Salimi Ughli, 3).

explanation can probably be sought in his rivalry with the *qūshbīgī*, Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, who happened to support the *Jadīds* in his attempt to suppress Burhān al-Dīn. Mīrzā Naṣrullāh was according to Salīm-bīk indirectly the person who allowed them, i.e. the *Jadīds*, to reach influential positions in the emirate, culminating in the replacement of qāzī-yi kalān Burhān al-Dīn with Sharīfjān Makhdūm in 1917. However, as the latter was a prominent 'ālim, Mīrzā Salīm-bīk did not dare to criticise him, and thus did not call him *Jadīd*. Still, the alliance between the *Jadīds*, including Sharīfjān Makhdūm, and Mīrzā Naṣrullāh, pushed Mīrzā Salīm-bīk towards Burhān al-Dīn and his allies.

The emergence of the *Jadīds* is something which is primarily associated with Mīrzā Naṣrullāh and thus he is blamed for it. He was the most influential person in the emirate, the emir not excluded, between 1910 and 1917. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk claims that the *qūshbīgī* invited many *Jadīds* to the capital from all around Bukhara who, thereafter, "strengthened their positions."⁷⁶ Still, the most prominent Bukharan *Jadīd*-authors in 1910 are never criticised by name in Salīm-bīk works. It thus appears, rather paradoxically, that the *Jadīd* he criticised most was probably the one who had least in common with Mīrzā Naṣrullāh *qūshbīgī*, i.e. Fayzullāh Khwājaev who later was to become the first president of the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara, established in 1920. This could, however, be explained by other factors, such as Fayzullāh Khwājaev's relative youth, his rather secular education, and, to some extent, lack of traditional Bukharan socialization. Another factor could be possible economic rivalries between Mīrzā Salīm-bīk and the Khwājaev family, both being traders in Tashkent.⁷⁷ Most important was probably that Fayzullāh Khwājaev played a key role in the Bolshevik attempt to seize Bukhara in 1918 which severely discredited the *Jadīds*.

After Salīm-bīk had been released from prison in 1921, he began to work in the Ministry of Enlightenment. He worked in the public library in Bukhara and in the *Bukhtariskom*, i.e. a Bukharan committee for the preservation of old monuments,

⁷⁶ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 129a.

⁷⁷ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk even claims that Fayzullāh Khwājaev financed the Bolshevik's attempt to seize Bukhara in 1918. (Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 151b).

arts, and nature. The Ministry of Enlightenment was, at this time, headed by ʿAbd al-Raʿūf Fiṭrat, while the *vaqf*-administration, which was the body within the Ministry of Enlightenment which supervised the *Bukhstariskom*, was headed by Muḥammad Sharīfjān Makhdūm. The latter, Fiṭrat, Salīm-bīk, and two uncles of the deposed emir were all members of the Historical Society in Bukhara.⁷⁸ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk therefore worked together with the *Jadīds* and other people from the previous *Tūmānī*-faction of Bukharan ʿulamā and representatives of the old tribal aristocracy, the most prominent of the *umarā*, including the old Shia *qūshbīgī*, Āstānaqul, in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara. In this way, he worked together with his ideological opponents, and in fact, it looks as if his long rivalry with Mīrzā Naṣrullāh had a decisive influence on all his political alliances.

⁷⁸ Not much has been written about this society. It was probably founded the 2nd of July, 1921 (see TsGARUz, f. p-46, op. 1, d. 218, l. 125), and produced at least one work, the *Tahqīqāt-i ark-i Bukhārā ū salāṭīn ū umarā-yi ū* written at some time between 1921–22 in the hand of Mīr Šiddīq Nāšir bin Amīr Muẓaffar. Today the work is kept in IVAN Uz. inv. no. 16 and is a history of Bukhara, primarily the city, but also includes the surrounding area, from mythological times up until the present. The work was written on an official order but it is entirely devoid of modern concepts of historical time.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's *Logosphere*

Bukhara and Tashkent

Burning books is an old tradition and reflects a belief in the possibility of influencing people's opinions by destroying the textual foundation of their less acceptable ideas. Emir Naṣrullāh's literary activities clearly reflected such sentiments,⁷⁹ and emir Muẓaffar did not satisfy himself with having disloyal ʿulamā executed or sent away from the capital, but followed his father's example and ordered the *qāẓī-yi kalān* (Šadr al-Dīn) to burn some of their books. Šadr al-Dīn was, for some reason, reluctant to carry out such a destructive order; he merely confiscated the books and kept them in his house; it was this collection which probably provided the foundation for one of the largest private libraries in Bukhara in the 1910s, i.e. that of Burhān al-Dīn, the grandchild of Šadr al-Dīn and the last of the *qāẓī-yi kalāns* from Khatlan.⁸⁰

Unfortunately, it is difficult to estimate the impact these books might have had on the *logosphere* of the oppositional ʿulamā in Bukhara during the last quarter of the 19th century, as is the influence this heritage might have had on Burhān al-Dīn's world of ideas during the 1910s. However, it testifies that we probably had an ideological cleavage already during the second half of the 19th century between those in power, represented by Šadr al-Dīn, and the opposition, many of whom had supported the rebellion against Muẓaffar. Nevertheless, both those in power and the opposition must have been engrossed in the prophetic discourse where the prime aim was to re-establish the rule of the *sharīʿa* in a temporally abbreviated sacred future. The latter, including a general call for *jihād* against the Russians, was, for example, how the rebellion against Muẓaffar had been

⁷⁹ Aynī, *Tāʾrīkh-i amīrān-i* 28.

⁸⁰ A.I. Kormilitsyn, *Rukopisnye Kollektii i Biblioteki na territorii Uzbekistana epokhi srednevekov'ya* (Tashkent: Tashkentskii Gosudarstvennyi Institut Kultury im. Kadyri, 1993) 37f. However, Lola Dodkhudoeva claims that it was Šadr al-Dīn's decision to confiscate the books, and that some of them were taken to his house, and some to the library of the emir. See Lola Dodkhudaeva, "La bibliotheque de Khvāja Mohammad Pārsā," *Cahiers d'Asie Centrale* [Tashkent – Aix-en-Provence] 5–6 (1998): 128.

legitimated in the 1860s, and from a Russian source we even know that an anti-Russian apocalyptic tractate circulated in Bukhara during this period.⁸¹

After the Russian conquest of Central Asia and the subjugation of Khiva and Bukhara, Tashkent soon became the most important town in the area. The first printing houses in the region appeared here as early as the 1870s, and the town became the unquestionable center for newspapers and lithographies, many of which were published in Persian and Turkic and found their way all over the Russian Empire and beyond. Such works had obviously all to pass through the Governor General's scrutiny and could, thus, not possibly be anti-Russian. The Russian authorities also tried to limit the number of printing presses in Turkistan during the whole colonial era.⁸² In addition to this, the Muslim modernists faced most of their problems due to Russia's fear of pan-Islamism and pan-Turkism, something which became particularly pressing after the outbreak of World War I. However, for the more traditionally-minded intellectuals, publishing was probably mainly a question of money. An increasing amount of literature was also brought in from India, Iran, Turkey, and from other Muslim communities in the Russian Empire, to Tashkent as well as to Bukhara. Most of these books were aimed at the *madrasas* and the *sharī'a*-courts in the region⁸³ which continued to exist in Russian Turkistan until the revolution. However, Tashkent was exposed to Russian culture much earlier and more thoroughly than was Bukhara, and to a certain extent the *ulamā* of Tashkent already in the 1870s faced questions that the Bukharan *ulamā* were not to face again before the Bolshevik invasion of 1920.

According to Naim Norkulov, Salīm-bīk's 12-year-stay in Tashkent was very formative. It was his contact with the learned in Tashkent which laid the foundation for his later activities as a writer, translator, and publisher.⁸⁴ Here he met many prominent Tashkent *ulamā*, some of whom he mentions in his memoirs. Among them we find Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ; Miyān Faḍl Miyān

⁸¹ "O polozhenii nashikh del v Bukharskom khanstve," *Moskva* [Moscow] 25 (1898).

⁸² Dudoignon, *Lectures* 254.

⁸³ Dudoignon, *Lectures* 253ff.

⁸⁴ Interview with Naim Norkulov, 24th of November, 2001.

Būrī, who wrote under the pen-name Muzammil; Sayyid Abū al-Qāsim Khān Khulafā; ʿAbd al-Sattār Makhdūm valad Khalīfa Ḥusayn Bukhārī; ʿAbd al-Zāhid Khwāja; and shaykh Aḥmad Qarātāshī.⁸⁵ Unfortunately, these people remain relatively unknown. Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ is probably the one who is most famous, thanks exclusively to his historical work *Ta'rikh-i jadīda-yi Tāshkand*,⁸⁶ a history of Transoxiana from mythological times to the time of the author. Although the work contains a very valuable chapter on 19th century Tashkent, it also includes a seemingly 'obligatory' mythological history of yore. Many of the works which Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ's history is based on thus clearly reflect an older worldview than the one prevalent in the writings of the Muslim modernists after the turn of the century.⁸⁷ However, in the part dealing with 19th century Tashkent, we also find two of the other people Salīm-bīk visited during his stay there. Abū al-Qāsim Khān (i.e. Ishān Abū al-Qāsim Khān Bīsh Aghāchī) was a prominent shaykh and *murshid* (a spiritual adviser) who had many students. He had built a *madrasa* next to his house in Tashkent. Aḥmad Makhdūm Qarātāshī (d. 1889) was also a prominent shaykh (Naqshbandi) who had many followers.⁸⁸

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's literary interest seems to have made him almost unique among the Bukharan *umarā*, and no other Bukharan could probably surpass him when it came to the number of books he published. Still, besides some newspapers, most of the lithographies printed in Central Asia were reprints of old manuscripts, and the discourse on progress and its 'new literature' probably made only a small contribution to the

⁸⁵ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 71a.

⁸⁶ Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ was born in Tashkent around 1830. He received a traditional education, first in Tashkent, then in various towns in the Ferghana valley and eventually in Bukhara (1855/56–1863/64) before he returned to Tashkent to work as an Imam in a mosque in the *Qiyāt* quarter. For a description of his life and this work, see A. Urinboev and O. Buriev, *Toshkent Muhammad Solih tavsifida* (Tashkent: Fan, 1983). See also his autobiography which is the last part of the three existing copies of his history of Tashkent kept in IVAN Uz. (inv. no. 7791, 11073, 5732).

⁸⁷ These include the *ʿAjāyib al-buldān*, *ʿAjāyib al-ʿābaqāt*, and others. See A. Urinboev and O. Buriev, *Toshkent* 9.

⁸⁸ Muḥammad Ṣāliḥ, *Ta'rikh-i jadīda-yi Tāshkand*, ms., IVAN Uz. inv. no. 11073/II, 281ab.

Central Asian literary production and consumption in general, and the Bukharan in particular, even during the two first decades of the 20th century when the Central Asian modernists found their way to the printing presses. Most of the lithographies published in Central Asia were in fact 'classics,' and were, thus, an integral part of the prophetic discourse where ethical restoration and re-islamisation was articulated through concepts reflecting a prophetic conceptualisation of historical time, and this call for ethical restoration and religious revitalisation was put forward through traditional literary genres.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk seems to have been a well-read man and, undoubtedly, a committed bibliophile. He possessed a voluminous book collection about which not much is known, except that it was confiscated when he was arrested in 1920.⁸⁹ Salīm-bīk also wrote some books himself, and published other authors' works;⁹⁰ books which were very much in line with other

⁸⁹ Like Burhān al-Dīn's private collection, Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's books were all transferred to the central library in Bukhara after Frunze's invasion. (Umnyakov, I.I. *Otchet o komandirovke v Bukharu l'etom 1921 goda dolozenyi na zasedanii soveta Turkistanskogo Vostochnogo Instituta 7 yulya 1921g.* Samarkandskiĭ oblastnoĭ arkhiv: f. 1762, d. 245, ll.32a–38b).

⁹⁰ His literary activity must have been quite well-known, but has only been mentioned by a handful of people. In his own *tadhkira*, the *Majmū'a-yi Salīmī* which was published in the *Tuhfat al-aḥbāb fī tadhkīrat al-aḥbāb ma' ta'rīkh-i kathīra va majmū'a-yi Salīmī* [sic] (Tashkent: Gulam' Hasan Arifdžhanov, 1332/1913–14) he mentions four of his: *Zubdat al-vā'izīn*, *Aḥādīth al-a'māl*, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī*, *Jāmi'-i gulzār*, and *Ka'b al-aḥbār va hikāyat 'Abdallāh ibn Mas'ūd*. (p. 388f) Muhtaram (*Tadhkira-yi* 115a) writes that he wrote strange (*gharība*) books and wonderful (*'ajība*) poetry. Semenov's work on Mīrzā Salīm-bīk is mainly based on Salīm-bīk's memoirs, *Tā'rīkh-i Salīmī*. Besides this, he also mentions *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* and *Tuhfat al-aḥbāb fī al-tadhkirat al-aḥbāb ma' ta'rīkh-i kathīra va majmū'a-yi Salīmī*. Semenov had his own copies of these two above-mentioned works. They are, today, kept in his apartment in Dushanbe. In addition to these works, Norkulov mentions *Jāmi'-i gulzār*, *Durrat al-vā'izīn*, *Mukhbīr al-hikāyat*, *Ka'b al-aḥbār hikāyalārī va hikāyat 'Abdallāh bin al-Mubārak va hikāyat-i Payghām-i Ta'ālā ha Mūsā 'alayhī al-salām*, *Gulshan-i rāz*, *Aḥādīth al-a'māl*, *Majālis al-naḥāyīs* and Afzal Pirnastī's *tadhkira*. However, he gives no bibliographical data on the latter two works. (Norkulov, *'Tarikh-i Salimi' – tsennyĭ* 10ff.). Ėpifanova only mentions *Kashkūl-i Salīmī*, *Jāmi'-i gulzār*, *Ka'b al-aḥbār hikāyalārī va hikāyat 'Abdallāh bin al-Mubārak va hikāyat-i Payghām-i Ta'ālā ha Mūsā*

lithographies published at that time. During his time as a *mīrshab* in Bukhara he donated several copies of *Salavāt-i Mas'ūdī* and *Siyar-i sharīf* to various mosques in the town. The former work is a voluminous work on *ḥanafīyya fiqh* compiled by the 12th century shaykh Mas'ūd bin Yūsuf Samarqandī and was very popular in Central Asia and India, where it frequently was republished at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. The latter work was written by Mu'īn al-Dīn bin Sharaf al-Dīn Ḥājī Muḥammad Farāhī Haravī in the 15th century and is a biography of Prophet Muḥammad. Both works were very popular, and the former, in particular, was extensively used in the *madrasas*.

We also have proof that Mīrzā Salīm-bīk was familiar with the works of the *Jadīds*, such as the journal *Samarqand* (edited by Maḥmūd-Khwāja Bihbūdī [d.1918]), Sayyid Aḥmad Šiddīqī's (d. 1927) *Mirāt-i 'Ibrat* and 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Fiṭrat's *Sīyāhatnāma-yi bayānāt-i hindī* and *Munāẓira*.⁹¹ The latter two works were probably the two most influential Bukharan *Jadīd* works, and they were squarely seated within the *Jadīd*-discourse.⁹²

'alayhī al-salām, Vāzīh's *tadhkira*, and of course *Tā'rīkh-i Salīmī*. (Ėpifanova, *Rukopisnye* 46f.).

⁹¹ For a recent well-written study of the *Munāẓira*, see Komatsu Hiasa, "Bukhara."

⁹² See Salīm-bīk, *Tuhfat* 330. Semenov remarks that Salīm-bīk mentions all contemporary *Jadīd* poets in this work, never reproaches them, and never calls them *Jadīds*. (Semenov, *Bukharskiĭ* 44).

Literary Production and Publications

We do not know what roused Salīm-bīk's literary interest, but according to his son he spent much time together with the literati.⁹³ Taking his stay in Tashkent into account, we can assume that the emerging lithography industry soon attracted his interest. What is striking is that, so far, we have no proof indication that he was an active writer outside traditional literary spheres. His literary activities were, thus, conservative, and focused, to a large extent, on an ethical restoration and an Islamic revitalisation. Likewise, Salīm-bīk was relatively Europhobic.

Some time after the turn of the century, Mīrzā Salīm-bīk made a pilgrimage to Qāsim Shaykh's shrine in Kermine. Here he found a copy of *Anīs al-jalīs*,⁹⁴ written in Arabic by the extremely prolific 15th century Egyptian scholar Jalāl al-Dīn al-Suyūṭī (d. 911/1505).⁹⁵ The work is didactic, and contains stories mainly from the Prophets, but also from kings of yore. It raises questions concerning many different topics, from monetary questions to praying. The Arabic original was very popular and frequently reprinted in Istanbul, at least towards the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries. We do not know if it was one of these lithographies which he found, but—although, at the time, he did not speak Arabic, or, at the most, had a poor knowledge of that language—he later translated it into Persian and had it published in Gulam' Khasan' Arifdzhano'v's publishing house in Tashkent in 1911.⁹⁶ Salīm-bīk made a

⁹³ Salimi Ughli, 29.

⁹⁴ Salimi Ughli, 4.

⁹⁵ See A. Urumbaev and L.M. Ėpifanova, eds. *Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR* (henceforth referred to as *SVRuz*), Vol. 7 (Tashkent: Nauka, 1964) 321f. The original Arabic version was published in Istanbul several times (1883, 1884, 1885, 1890, and 1904 [ibid.]).

⁹⁶ The lithographed ms was written by ʿAbd al-Mannān Qārī in 1325/1907–08. (See p.261) The same person also copied the ms of *Bāgh-i Iram* and *Kushkūl-i Salīmī* (see below for a description of these works). His full name was ʿAbd al-Mannān ʿAbd al-Vahhāb Ūghlī (1880–1945), and he later worked in IVAN Uz. in Tashkent. ("Abdulmannon Kotib" *ʻUzbekiston Millii Ėnsiklopediyasi*, Vol. 1 (Tashkent: Davlat ilmi nashriyoti, 2000) 36.

Turkic translation too, signed: 25th May, 1917.⁹⁷ The latter was made because some of his friends in Tashkent wanted to see a Turkic translation. However, the Turkic version was never published. Salīm-bīk's two translations, the Turkic and the Persian, were put into verse and given the name *Jāmiʿ-yi gulzār*. The *Anīs al-jalīs* was only one of several books Salīm-bīk translated for the benefit "of those who did not know Arabic." Another book which he also translated because of his friends in Tashkent was a work in Persian called *Būstān-i khayāl*.⁹⁸ However, this was never published.

His *Durrat al-vāʿiẓīn*, which was published in Bukhara in 1909 by the publisher Mullā Sulṭān Bukhārī,⁹⁹ was a translation of many "famous" (although unmentioned) Arabic books. It deals with the usual legal aspects of religious life, common to the literature of the ʿulamā, i.e. knowledge and learning, ritual observance, and regulation of personal and social aspects of life; it might thus be called a manual on Islam. Salīm-bīk writes that he got the Arabic original when he served as *ḥākim* in Shirabad in 1325/1907–08.¹⁰⁰

Another of Salīm-bīk's translations is the *Aḥādīth al-Aʿmāl*, published in Bukhara in 1330/1911–12 by the publisher Sulṭān ibn Mullā Šābir Bukhārī.¹⁰¹ The work is an abbreviated and simplified translation from Osmanli of imām al-Bukhārī's *1001 ḥadīth*, which fell into Salīm-bīk's hands in 1328/1910 when he served as *ḥākim* in Shahrīsabz.¹⁰²

Salīm-bīk also published a collection of religious didactic stories in verse written in Turkic and Persian, obviously aimed at children. The work was called *Kaʿb al-Aḥbār ḥikāyaları wa ḥikāyat ʿAbd Allāh ibn al-Mubārak wa ḥikāyat payghām-i allāh taʿālā ba Mūsā ʿalayhi al-salām*, and was published in Gulam'

⁹⁷ For the Uzbek translation of this work, refer to C. A. Storey, *Persidskaya literatura. Bio-bibliograficheskiĭ obzor* (Pererabotal i dopolnil Yu. Ė. Bregel'), Vol. 2 (Moscow: Nauka, 1972) 1175; *SVRuz* Vol. 7, 321f.

⁹⁸ Salimi Ughli, 32f. I have neither been able to identify this work nor to locate the ms.

⁹⁹ The lithographed ms is dated 1326 and 1327 (See pp.127 and 168).

¹⁰⁰ Salīm-bīk, *Durrat* 2.

¹⁰¹ The lithographed ms was written by Mullā Sulṭān bin Šābir al-Bukhārī in 1329 (1911) (see 1, 144).

¹⁰² See *Aḥādīth al-aʿmāl* 2f. Norkulov claims that it was published in Bukhara in 1911 (Norkulov, *Tarikh-i Salimi* – *tsennyĭ* 12).

Khasan' Arifdzhonov's publishing house in Tashkent in 1331/1912–13. The work focusses on shaykh Ka'b al-Aḥbār who is claimed to have lived 4,000 years ago and whose *mazār* is situated in Bukhara.¹⁰³

Another work Salīm-bīk translated was shaykh Muḥammad bin Aḥmad bin Ayās al-Ḥanafī's *Badāyī' al-zuhūr min vaqāyī' al-duhūr*. Salīm-bīk's version was called *Mukhbīr al-ḥikāyāt*, and the manuscript, dated 1326/1908,¹⁰⁴ was, as far as I know, never published. The work is of some interest as it reflects an earlier worldview, very much in harmony with the genre *Marvels of Creation*, and is thus an expression of a more traditional ontology. Here we can read about the creation, pre-modern divisions of the world, and what causes rain and snow, etc. However, most of the pages are an account of pre-Islamic prophets.

Salīm-bīk was the first to publish the Bukharan poet Qārī Raḥmatullāh Vāziḥ's (d. 1893)¹⁰⁵ very popular *tadhkira*, the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb fī tadhkirat al-aṣḥāb*. Vāziḥ was the one who reintroduced the genre *tadhkira* to Bukharan writers.¹⁰⁶ His *tadhkira* was probably the first of its kind. The first edition was finished in 1871,¹⁰⁷ and mainly contained biographies and poems of 19th century Bukharan poets. The full title of the book published by Salīm-bīk was actually *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb fī tadhkirat al-aṣḥāb ma' ta'rīkh-i kathīra va majmū'a-yi Salīmī*, and thus

¹⁰³ Ėpifanova, *Rukopisnye* 47.

¹⁰⁴ See I.209a. The manuscript is kept in IVAN Uz., inv. no. 2743.

¹⁰⁵ Qārī Raḥmatullāh Vāziḥ was probably born around 1244/1818. He received a traditional education, and served the future emir Muẓaffar during the 1850s when the latter was *ḥākim* in Kermine but he did not make a career at court. He gathered enough money to go on *hajj* in 1886. His literary production included works in Persian, Turkic, and Arabic, but his two most famous works today were written in Persian. His frequently copied *tadhkira*, the *Tuḥfat al-aḥbāb fī tadhkirat al-aṣḥāb*, was dedicated to Muẓaffar, and finished in 1288/1871 (Rasul Hodizoda, *Adabiyoti Tojik dar nimai duvvūmi asri XIX*, Vol. 1 [Dushanbe: Donish, 1968] 189). Another of his works, an equally popular *hajjnāma*, the *Gharāyib al-khabar fī 'ajāyib as-safar* (ms., IVAN Uz. inv. no. 2106), was written in 1304/1887 and dedicated to the recently enthroned 'Abd al-Aḥad.

¹⁰⁶ R. Khadi-zade, *Istochniki k izucheniyu Tadjzhikskoi literatury vtoroi poloviny XIX veka* (Stalinabad: Izdatel'stvo Akademii Nauk Tadjzhikskoi SSR, 1956) 29.

¹⁰⁷ Khadi-zade, *Istochniki* 30.

consisted of two *tadhkiras* and one historiography. Vāziḥ's *tadhkira* covers the first 293 pages, while the rest (i.e. pages 294–432) is the so-called *Majmū'a-yi Salīmī*, i.e. Salīm-bīk's own *tadhkira*, which consists of much poetry by poets from Shahrīsabz, but also many poems written by himself. Here we also have verification that he admired the literary production of many of those later referred to as *Jadīds* (although not by himself), many of whom he praised in this work which was published in Gulam' Hasan Arifdzhonov's publishing house in Tashkent in 1332/1913–14, i.e. the same year as his dismissal from his post as *ḥākim* in Shahrīsabz, and during the period when the political struggle between the *Jadīds* and *Qadīms* was very intense. The original title of the historiography, here written exclusively in the margin (pp.4–357), was *Ta'rīkh-i Sayyid Rāqim*. The first edition of the work was written by Mullā Sharīf al-Dīn 'Alam bin Nūr al-Dīn akhund Mullā Farḥād Samarqandī in the 17th century. The work was re-edited several times, especially by a certain Amīr Sayyid Sharīf Rāqim Samarqandī.¹⁰⁸ The history focuses on famous people living mainly in Central Asia, from the birth of Timur until the middle of the 17th century, and was very popular in Central Asia.

Another of Salīm-bīk's works published at the Gulam' Khasan' Arifdzhonov publishing house was the *Bāgh-i Iram va afzal al-tadhkār fī dhikr al-shu'arā va al-ash'ār va tadhkira Navā'ī*.¹⁰⁹ The book contains three different works and was published in 1918. The main text is the *Bāgh-i Iram* (pp.1–304), while the Bukharan poet Afzal Makhdūm Pīrmastī's (d.1915) *tadhkira*,¹¹⁰ and 'Alī Shīr Navā'ī's (d.1501) *tadhkira Majālis al-*

¹⁰⁸ A.A. Semenov, "K voprosu, kto byl avtorom Ta'rīkh-i Sayyid Rāqim," *Iqd al-juman. V.V. Bartol'du turkestanskies druz'ya, ucheniki i pochitateli* (Tashkent: ?, 1927).

¹⁰⁹ See Khadi-Zade, *Istochniki* 75.

¹¹⁰ Norkulov, *Tarikh-i Salimi* – *tsennyi* 12. Hodizoda claims the same (Hodizoda, *Adabiyoti* 288 n.236) According to Hodizoda (who, according to his footnotes, based his information on the *tadhkiras* of Hashmat, [ms., IVAN Uz., inv. no. 2728], Muḥtaram [ms., IVAN Uz., inv. no. 394], and Ṣadr-i Ziyā [ms., IVAN Uz., inv. no. 1304],) Afzal Makhdūm Pīrmastī was born sometime in the late 1840s in the village of Pīrmastī outside Bukhara. His forefathers had emigrated from Herat. He received a traditional education in Bukhara, and later worked for Hashmat, the prolific writer and son of emir Muẓaffar, who at that time (i.e. during the 1870s) served as

Nafā'is were written in the margins (pages 2–152 and 153–251, respectively). Pīrmastī's *tadhkira* differs little from Vāziḥ's, and is focused on Bukharan poets who were active during the protectorate era, while 'Alī Shīr Navā'ī's *tadhkira* mainly contains information about contemporary poets of the period. The *Bāgh-i Iram*, also known as *Bihrūz ū Bahrām*, was written by Navā'ī's contemporary Kamāl al-Dīn 'Alī ibn Muḥammad Sabz (d.1512), who was also known by his two pen-names *Hālī* and *Bināyī*.¹¹¹ The work is a didactic epos centered around two brothers, Bihrūz and Bahrām. The latter is a good-for-nothing, while Bihrūz is just the opposite. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's *Bāgh-i Iram* was lithographed from a very complete manuscript, and it might very well have been the first time it was published.

Salīm-bīk also published Maḥmūd Shabistārī's (d.1320) *Gulshan-i rāz* in 1908 in Bukhara with the publisher Mullā Sulṭān ibn Mullā Šābir. This is a very popular didactical *mathnavī*, the theme of which is the doctrine of the perfect man. *Gulshan-i rāz* was frequently published at the end of the 19th and beginning of the 20th century, but Salīm-bīk's copy was the only one to be published in Bukhara. Salīm-bīk added two treatises of 'Abd al-Ḥākim Tirmidhī (d.893) to the *Gulshan-i rāz*. These were the *Nawrūznāma* and the *Sālnāma*; basically two collections of adages put in verse, briefly providing information on how the years will be depending on the day of the week that the first day of the year falls on, how the different years will be according to the oriental zodiac, but also adages like what may be expected after a magpie's cry, etc.¹¹² These two treatises are followed by a rather lengthy *qaṣīda* written by Salīm-bīk

ḥākim in Charjou. When 'Abd al-Aḥad became emir and Hashmat was imprisoned, Pīrmastī lost his patron, and served as imam in the villages around Bukhara. The last years of his life he spent in his native village. He wrote his *tadhkira* in 1322/1904, and died in 1334/1915. See Khadi-zade, *Istochniki* 70f.

¹¹¹ For this, see A.M. Mirzoev, *Kamal ad-Din Binai* (Moscow: Nauka, 1976) 120.

¹¹² These two works are described in *Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan: Tochnye i estestvennye nauki*, ed. A.B. Vil'danova (Tashkent: Fan, 1998) 135–140.

himself. Here he describes his own career, the bad morals of the *umarā*, and the wretched situation of the people in the emirate.¹¹³

Salīm-bīk's most popular work was probably the *Kashkul-i Salīmī va ta'rikh-i mutaqaddimīn va muta'akhhirīn*, which was published in Tashkent at Gulam' Khasan' Arifjanov's publishing house in 1333/1914.¹¹⁴ The work contains historiographies on pre-Islamic prophets, pre and post-Islamic Iranian mythological and real kings (pp. 194–213), as well as Central Asian rulers (pp. 217–278). It is also a history of the early Caliphs, including the Umayyads and the Abbasids (pp. 214–217). It also consists of historiographies on the Rurik and Romanov dynasties (pp. 278–289), the Ottomans (pp. 301–332),¹¹⁵ and Greek philosophers (pp. 290–301). Therefore, with some exceptions it is a dynastic historiography.

For us, one of his most valuable works is the *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī*,¹¹⁶ which contains much interesting information written by one of the few who spent most of the time between 1917 and 1920 in the capital of the emirate (the work was finished soon after the Red Army invasion of Bukhara in 1920). Like many other historiographies, the focus is on the author's own experiences, i.e. during the reigns of emir Muẓaffar, 'Abd al-Aḥad, and 'Ālim

¹¹³ I have been unable to find a complete version of this *qaṣīda*. In the four copies of this work kept in IVAN Uz. the last few pages of this work have been systematically torn out.

¹¹⁴ The work was finished in 1331/1913 (see p.334) and financed by a certain 'Abd al-Karīm bin Mullā 'Abd al-Razīq.

¹¹⁵ Salīm-bīk was not positive about the calls for reform in the Ottoman empire, something he writes about in this history, see especially from p.322 onwards.

¹¹⁶ The work is kept in IVAN Uz., inv. no. 2016. This manuscript has been described in A. A. Semenov, ed., *Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii Nauk Uzbekskoi SSR*, Vol. 1 (Tashkent: Uzssr Fanlar Akademiyasining Nashriyoti, 1952) 93f; D.Yu. Yusupova and R.P. Dzhalilova, eds., *Sobranie vostochnykh rukopisei Akademii Nauk Respubliki Uzbekistan: Istoriya* (Tashkent: Fan, 1998) 232; Ėpifanova, *Rukopisnye* 44–51; Vil'danova, *Tsenyū*; and Storey, *Persidskaya*, Vol. 2, 1174–77. Norkulov's dissertation is almost exclusively about this work and contains an almost complete Russian translation from the reign of emir Muẓaffar until the Red Army invasion of Bukhara in 1920 (i.e. fol. 61b–230b). Norkulov's two articles, referred to above, are also based on this work. Likewise, Semenov's paper is mainly based on this manuscript. (Semenov, *Bukharskiĭ*).

Khān, but the work begins with a short history of Central Asia, not without similarities to his *Kashkūl-i Salīmī*.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk also copied some other works and had them bound together in one volume. I have been unable to work on this volume as it is kept in a private collection in Bukhara, but according to its owner the work contains nothing new, but is merely a collection of copies of older works. Norkulov mentions that Mīrzā Salīm-bīk also wrote another memoir after the Bukharan revolution, but that this book has perished.¹¹⁷

¹¹⁷ Norkulov, "Ta'rikh-i Salīmī" kak": 59.

The Beginning of 'West-toxication'

The knowledge Mīrzā Salīm-bīk imparted to his readers was, in many respects, fundamentally different from that of the *Jadīds*, few of whom would write in their newspapers or journals about the consequences of a crying magpie, or rely on Ayās al-Ḥanafī's explanations for the reasons for rain and snow. Still, the value of his *tadhkiras* should not be underestimated, neither should his publication of *Ta'rikh-i Sayyid Rāqim*. Especially the ethical aspects of some other works, like *Bihrūz ū Bahrām*, were probably also appreciated by the modernists, and his more Islamic works reflected an enthusiasm for a re-islamisation that many Bukharan 'ulamā probably shared with him, and among them probably also sympathisers with the modernists, like the prominent pro-new-method school mufti Dāmlā Ikrām.¹¹⁸ Salīm-bīk shared the *Jadīds'* and Dāmlā Ikrām's eagerness for a re-islamisation of the populace which they all considered as rather ignorant of 'true' Islam. We thus see a potential common interest in educating the masses; Salīm-bīk wrote in one of his works that on the Day of Judgement the severest punishment will be meted out to those 'ulamā who do not share their knowledge with the people.¹¹⁹ This imperative was also reflected in his literary activities. Among other things, he partly devoted himself to translating books in Arabic into Persian or Turkic so that they would benefit those who did not speak Arabic. Still, his hostility towards *Jadīdism* was only evident in his memoirs written after 1917. We do not really know the change in his attitude towards the new-method schools. However, his connections to the shaykhs in Tashkent certainly call for a more subtle approach to the activities of those usually considered as pure traditionalists.

Instead Mīrzā Salīm-bīk seems to have been an example of a neo-traditionalist, which we might rather tentatively define as one who strove for Islamic revitalisation within the prophetic discourse. The main question for those, as well as the

¹¹⁸ Most notably, his collection *Risāla-yi 'arabiya dar bayān-i chihil hālāt dar ḡam-i chihil baṭn-i munāsakha ma' bayān-i qavā'id-i ān va risāla-yi fārsiya dar bayān-i bid'at-i mashhūra mā hikāyāt-i gharība va risāla-yi fārsī dar bayān-i vujūb-i satr-i nisā va āyāt-i dāllīya bar ān (??: 1330/1911–1912). Many thanks to Shimada Shizuo for this reference.*

¹¹⁹ Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* 36.

Neo-traditionalist

traditionalists and the modernists, was the future of the Muslim community, and their respective conceptualisation of the future was directly related to their respective discourse. The modernists labelled their future with coinages and calques, such as the Iranian Persian *āyanda*, which signified a new earthly temporality. However, for Mīrzā Salīm-bīk and for those who shared his bi-temporal ontology, i.e. only recognising the present and the hereafter, the future of the Muslim community could not be situated in a new temporality with its unique yet-to-come historical experiences. The contemporary era as a normative temporality, spatially situated in the West, was thus very far from Salīm-bīk's worldview, and made him much more Europhobic than many of the *Jadīds*. This is of some interest as he ought to have got many of his ideas about an Islamic revitalisation while he, at that time, in his 20s, was working in a rapidly Russified and modernised Tashkent. Salīm-bīk thus advocated a more indigenous and Islamic call for reforms than the *Jadīds*, which were more open to knowledge stemming from the West. One work published in 1911 by Mīrzā Salīm-bīk contains the following lines:

"...because of ignorance and not knowing and not having read the truth of Islam, most of the people of this time consider that science (*faṣīlat*) and wisdom (*dānishmandī*) belong to the Europeans (*ahl-i farang*) and the Christians. They consider that the Muslims are deprived of science (*ilm*) and knowledge (*dānish*); they invent lies (*iftirāhāyī mikunand*), and tell everyone about the knowledge possessed by the Europeans and the Russians, making the faith of the young Muslims weak, and increasing their doubts day by day. I know so many people that do not hear a single advantageous word of the prophet or the Great Companions (*saḥāba-yi karām*) or the saints when they are told a tradition (*rivāyat*) or story (*hikāyat*). They leave the meeting one by one, and complain much about the false ideas of the speaker, but if they hear nonsensical stories from Russian and European books, then they listen attentively..."¹²⁰

¹²⁰ Salīm-bīk, *Aḥādīth al-ʿamāl* 5.

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's publications mentioned above were not a part of the discourse on progress. Not only was the temporal focus different, but so was the spatial; all his sources originated in the Islamic world. His known literary activity shows that he was mainly active in traditional literary circles which were in harmony with his prophetic conceptual apparatus. Modern concepts of historical time would only be reproduced on the few occasions when he reproduced works in which they were used, and thus probably exclusively to be seen in a few lines in his *tadhkira*.¹²¹

The question of space was very different as the territorialisation of many traditional concepts was much less a threat to the traditional teleology (and ontology) than to the idea of progress and its indefinite number of temporal extensions. It is noteworthy that when Mīrzā Salīm-bīk mentions people in favour of the new-method schools in his *tadhkira*, he neither calls them *Jadīds*, nor *Taraqqīparvars*. The only factor which separates this group of poets (ex. Fiṭrat, ʿAjizī, ʿAynī, and Munẓim) from other poets in his *tadhkira* is that they wrote what Salīm-bīk calls *millī* and/or *vaṭanī* poetry, i.e. national/confessional or patriotic poetry. That is to say, Salīm-bīk uses a non-temporalised concept when he describes them, a concept which was increasingly related to mapped territories, but not really to national historiographies.¹²² Their literature is thus not referred to in terms of time (i.e. as new [*jadīd*, *naw*], as the *Jadīds* sometimes called their literature), but in terms of space (i.e. *millī/vaṭanī*).¹²³ The emerging discursive polarisation

¹²¹ The best example of this is a poem written by Munẓim and copied by Salīm-bīk in his *tadhkira*. The poem was written in honour of ʿĀlim Khān's enthronement in 1910, and contains many modern concepts of historical time embodied in lexemes such as *rivāj*, *taraqqī*, *iṣlāḥ* etc. See his *tadhkira* pp.326ff.

¹²² National histories appeared later, see Adeeb Khalid, "The Emergence of a Modern Central Asian Historical Consciousness," *Historiography of Imperial Russia: The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State*, ed. Thomas Sanders (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1999).

¹²³ It might be questionable whether these two classifications, i.e. in terms of space and in terms of time, can really be made an issue. The *Jadīds* themselves most often referred to their literature in terms of space. However, as from the argument which follows below, I do claim that it would have been impossible for Mīrzā Salīm-bīk to admire a literary work, he classified as *Jadīd*.

between the rival political factions in Bukhara seems, in fact, to be most easily discernible through temporal concepts rather than spatial. Many people cared about the Russian intrusion into Bukharan territory, which almost certainly was increasingly conceived as a geo-body thanks to map-making. However, they disagreed about the question of permissible change in what, for many, was not only a sacred society, but also a sacred time, and that struggle was reflected in the polarisation of the temporal structure of concepts related to historical time. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's linguistic prefiguration was, thus, in harmony with his literary reproduction mentioned above, which was, like his conceptual apparatus, focused on prophetic rather than evolutionary development, something, which among other things, is evident in the metaphorical structure of the concepts subscribed to. Still, although the discourses and the different conceptualisations of historical time were mutually exclusive, the lexemes in them rarely differed.

Untimely News

In a text from 1913, a prominent Muslim modernist in Samarkand writes that there had been a decline (*tanazzul*) in the Islamic world during the previous five or six centuries, and this, according to Ḥaẓrat-i Mawlavī, he writes, was caused by the *‘ulamā*. If, he continues, someone during this time blames the *‘ulamā* for this, then he is accused of being a protagonist of the new-method schools and is thus an infidel, "however, Ḥaẓrat-i Mawlavī complained about the *‘ulamā*, the *rūḥānīn* (mystics), the shaykhs, and the *ru'asā* (chiefs), and said that they were the reason for the fall and decline of Islam. So, today it seems that the advocates of progress and the seekers of reforms are not *Jadīd* (new [or possibly innovators]), but *Qadīmchī* (oldies), and they are among the followers of the *Salaf-i Ṣāliḥ* (The Noble Ancients)."¹²⁴

Bihbūdī's statement above reflects the essence of the temporal structure of the classification *jadīd* which was problematic not only in Russian Turkistan and in Bukhara, but also in other Muslim communities in the Russian empire, where the concept *jadīd* had double meanings which originated from its temporal structure. In one discourse the coefficient of change in the concept was prophecy and, thus, one of deviation from divine injunctions; in the other it was one of progress and, thus, of evolutionary development. The temporal structure of the two discourses was also different. The discourse on prophecy was based on experience where nothing could happen outside sacred time; events were mere symbols. The discourse on progress was based on expectation, and the rational forecast which went with it was nothing other than the conceptual opposite of prophecy.¹²⁵

In the non-temporalised (i.e. experience-based rather than expectation-based [prophecy versus progress]) discourse, *jadīd* became primarily associated with *the other* (in this case the non-Islamic), which in times of social and political upheavals, such as the time of the Russian conquest and the period between 1917 and 1920, became a sign that the end of the world was nigh.

¹²⁴ Maḥmūd Khwāja (Bihbūdī), "Mulāḥiẓa," *Āyna* [Samarkand] 1 (20 August 1913): 31.

¹²⁵ See also Reinhart Koselleck, *Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time* (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 1985) 13.

Jadīd, in Salīm-bīk's most frequent subscription of the lexeme, is thus an asymmetrical classification which frequently appears in paradigmatic relationships with lexemes like *kāfir* (infidel) and *murtadd* (apostate), etc. *Jadīd* is accordingly situated in the same semantic field as *bid'ā* (novelty), the abolition of which Salīm-bīk praises previous rulers for, like emir Shāh Murād (r. 1785–1800).¹²⁶ Mullā Ghaybullāh, a *Jadīd*-hostile 'ālim from Vabkent outside Bukhara, similarly most frequently referred to the *Jadīds* as the *ahl-i bid'at* (the people of the un-Islamic novelties),¹²⁷ and from one *ḥadīth* quoted by Mīrzā Salīm-bīk (see below) we know that in the discourse on prophecy there existed a legal ground for killing *Jadīds*. In the tense atmosphere of the day after the proclamation of Miller's manifest in 1917, 'Abd al-Šamad Khwāja Šudūr (the *ra'īs* of Bukhara) was physically attacked by *Qadīms* at an assembly in Mīrzā Naṣrullāh's house for saying that the *Jadīds* were not *kāfirs*,¹²⁸ and during the repression of the *Jadīds* after 1917 we know that the mere accusation of being *Jadīd* sufficed for many a summary execution.¹²⁹

It comes as no surprise that Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's verbal attacks on Mīrzā Naṣrullāh follow the same patterns in terms of time and ethics.¹³⁰ For Mīrzā Salīm-bīk the activity and aims of the *Jadīds* and Mīrzā Naṣrullāh clearly violated the *sharī'a*. After the latter's rise to power in 1910, Mīrzā Salīm-bīk claims that the new-method schools moved away from their semi-clandestineness and began to spread (*rivāj*), leading people away from Islam, something Salīm-bīk describes as a gradual phenomenon as the first new-method schools only had books on

¹²⁶ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 53a; Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* 262.

¹²⁷ Mullā Ghaybullāh Khwāja-yi Mīrkhardī, *Du'ānāma-yi shāhī ki mutazammīn jangnāma-yi khāqānī*, ms., IVAN Uz., inv. no. 2166/I.

¹²⁸ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 133b.

¹²⁹ This was especially the case after the Kolesov incident in which many people were killed, accused of being *Jadīd*, see for example Baljuvani, *Ta'rikh-i* 53.

¹³⁰ A fairly clear example of this, in terms of ethics, is when Salīm-bīk denounces Mīrzā Naṣrullāh because of his and his father's improper conduct. They both, he claims, had forsaken their fathers. Moreover, he claims that Mīrzā Naṣrullāh was from Balkh, i.e. from Southern Turkistan, and thus an outsider (Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 125b).

Islam, while they later deviated completely from the *sharī'a*.¹³¹ Salīm-bīk claims that Mīrzā Naṣrullāh turned away from Islam and invented a new (*Jadīd*) religion (*dīn*) and traditions ('*ayin*).¹³² The 'non-islamicness' of the *Jadīds* is further emphasised by frequent syntagmatic relationships between the *Jadīds* and the Russians/Christians, or in one instance the relationship between the *Jadīds* and Istanbul.¹³³ Salīm-bīk is also keen to show the presence of Shia and *Challas* (Bukharan-Jewish converts to Islam) among the *Jadīds*.¹³⁴

The *Jadīds* were, thus, nothing other than a sign that the end of the world was drawing high. In fact, reflections upon new and old things, which is frequently encountered in the *Jadīd* writings, especially in their travelogues where new town planning, architecture, technology, etc., are compared with older things, are absent in Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's writings. Without elaborating on it here, it should be mentioned that such reflections are not completely unrelated to a temporal mode of observation where the tension between the old and the new becomes 'time-producing' and thus increasingly disharmonious to 'time-killing' prophecy. The only semantic polarisations between the new and old (here represented by the lexemes *jadīd* and *qadīm*) we find in Salīm-bīk's memoirs are in the educational sphere, and in this

¹³¹ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 179a. In fact, to a large extent, this gradual deviation from Islam might have been a quite common attitude towards the *Jadīds*, whose deviation became clear for many for the first time during 1917 and especially after the Kolesov campaign. See, for example, Mullā Ghaybullāh, who claims that the new-method schools first took the right pass, but that they later became "devilish." (Mullā Ghaybullāh, *Du'ānāma-yi* 8a) However, Salīm-bīk writes almost nothing about the new-method itself, more than a notion that the old teachers (*maktabdārḥā-yi qadīmī*) became jealous because people began to send their children to the new schools where they learned to read and write relatively fast. (Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 178aff).

¹³² Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 125ab, 129a.

¹³³ Salīm-bīk writes that the first new-method schools in Bukhara opened when the Bukharan subject Mullā Jurā returned from Istanbul. However, this seems to be the only place where the role of Istanbul is implicated in the *Jadīd*-movement by Salīm-bīk. (Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 178ab).

¹³⁴ *Jadīd* was also a classification for Jewish converts to Shia Islam in Merv (or such converts originating in Merv). See A. Garlitskiĭ, "Evrei v Bukhare," *Srednyaya Aziya* [Tashkent] 2 (1910) and A. Bernari, "Dzhedidy," *Turkestanskiĭ kur'er* [Tashkent] 195 (1910).

sphere they are only encountered in a few instances and then mainly with regard to a question about subjects (Islamic/non-Islamic).¹³⁵ In Mullā Ghaybullāh's *Jadīd*-hostile work briefly referred to above, the most frequently encountered semantic polarisation is likewise not between the new and the old, but between *bid'at* and *sunnat* (i.e. 'un-Islamic' novelties and traditions [of the prophet]).¹³⁶ Thus, the struggle between the *Jadīds* and their antagonists cannot, in the prophetic discourse, be seen as a struggle between reactionaries and progressives as the course of time is very differently conceptualised.

¹³⁵ It might even be improper to talk about a 'polarisation' as the words are very rarely counter-posed in his works.

¹³⁶ Mullā Ghaybullāh, *Du'ānāma-yi*.

The Progress Proxy

In Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's works the 'horizontalisation' of central concepts is absent; *taraqqī* (the lexeme in which the *Jadīds* embedded the modern concept of progress) is thus not metaphorically structured by horizontal metaphors, like 'going forward or backward', but as 'going up and down'. Bukhara can thus not be described as a backward country. *Taraqqī* hence retains the vertical structure of the prophetic discourse. Other concepts are similarly unaffected by this 'horizontalisation', which affected all concepts which structured *taraqqī* in the discourse on progress. It is thus obvious that he did not share the *Jadīds*' ideas about cyclical repressive progress and the primacy of human agency. The first time this can be seen in his works is 1911; on page five in his *Aḥādīth al-a'māl* it is written that:

"...it came to my mind that prosperity and adversity is dependent on God's will. When it happens that prosperity becomes a companion of a religion, confession (*millat*), person, and individual, then his work goes well. He points with this finger, he praises and blesses, and thousands of his faults and defects do not remain to be seen. And when it happens that prosperity is changed to adversity, then everything which remains begins to suffer from misfortune..."

A profound difference between the modern and prophetic *taraqqīs* is to be found in at least one instance in his *Ta'rīkh-i Salīmī*, i.e. when he praised the last Ottoman sultan, Mehmed VI, for having 'imprisoned' the two young Turks, Enver Pasha and Talat Pasha. With reference to this event in the Ottoman Empire he wrote: "we hope that the banner of Islam rises and that the spreading of Islam increases and that the heretics and infidels will be repelled."¹³⁷ This is a very interesting statement, as his conceptualisation of *taraqqī* was fundamentally different from the one used by his antagonists, both in Anatolia and in Bukhara.

¹³⁷ "umid ast ki 'ilm-i Islam rafti gardida rivāj-i Islām taraqqī yāfta ahl-i bid'at u zalālat sarnigūn gardand..." (Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rīkh-i Salīmī* 205ab).

what is progress
(taraqqi)

For Salīm-bīk salvation through evolutionary development was not possible. The combination of human agency and knowledge/science in order to make one's country progress was never put forward by Salīm-bīk. Science was thus not a function of evolutionary development, but "fruits of faith,"¹³⁸ and in his *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* he devoted several pages to praising science by referring to a discussion between the hypocrites (*munāfiq*) and the prophet in a typical timeless manner.¹³⁹

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk never reflected upon technological innovations, and partly for this reason he did not need a strategy to incorporate *the other* into Islam, as did the *Jadīds* who referred to progress and historicism. That does not, however, mean that he shunned Western technological innovations. For example, the once so sensitive railroad is only mentioned briefly, and although mentioned, the emir's initial negative stance towards the railroad and the telegraph was not contemplated.¹⁴⁰ It was most probably not an important issue in the 1910s. Moreover, as we have seen above, the lithography technology was something he made frequent use of.

Salīm-bīk never reflected upon the uniqueness of the present, nor is the *Jadīd* imperative to become contemporary discernible, and it could not be, as the struggle for becoming contemporary requires temporalities and con-temporalities; Salīm-bīk only recognized this world and the hereafter. His bi-temporal ontology does not require any semantic expansion of chronological markers; lexemes like *ʿaṣr* and *zamān* (i.e. durative time) do not mark any specific set of historical experiences, and appear almost exclusively in syntagmatic relationships with rulers and dynasties. They are thus not detached from naturally formed chronologies. Abstract forms of qualitative periodisation are therefore absent. His *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* is, as was mentioned above, in many ways a traditional dynastic historiography in which events on the world political

¹³⁸ Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* 36. He also writes that the Bukharans who died during Kolesov's attack died because God wanted them to die, and that they became martyrs. (Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 149b).

¹³⁹ Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* 36–39.

¹⁴⁰ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 79a. He actually even praised the railroad, but he was also aware of the implications of it for traditional modes of transport (Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* 175, 265).

scene are not interlinked. Except for references to the year when the author wrote the work, the work is not chronologically synchronised; Islamic rulers are organised through *hijrī*, while Russian dynasties are organised through *milādī* (*ʿīṣavī*).

While the sophisticated *Jadīds* criticised the *Qadīms* for causing regress and decline, Mīrzā Salīm-bīk criticised the *Jadīds* for causing disorder and instability. It was because of Mīrzā Naṣrullāh's "unstable religion" and "inharmonious traditions" that Mīrzā Naṣrullāh replaced the old *qāzī-yi kalān*, Burhān al-Dīn, with the pro-*Jadīd* Sharīfjān Makhdūm in 1917.¹⁴¹ Instability is also a central concept in the criticisms levelled at the new-method schools. He denounced them as causing discord (*fitna*) and mischief (*fisād*), while everyone who had studied in the old [well-] established schools (*maktab-i muqarrar-i qadīm*) were presented as learned (*mullās*).¹⁴²

However, the transfer of power to the *Jadīds* (related to the proclamation of Miller's manifest in 1917, when the *Jadīds*, supported by the Russians, tried to strengthen their positions) would not only imply the end of the *sharīʿa* and *ḥukūmat* (government),¹⁴³ but the ensuing disorder could even be interpreted as a sign that the end of the world was drawing to a close. Salīm-bīk quotes a *ḥadīth* in bad Arabic which he claims to be from imām al-Bukhārī (d. 870), and then provides us with a Persian translation:

"At the end of time there appears a group (*qawm*) of men that is young and foolish, and have just reached maturity, and they speak the words of the great imam and other dignities. They mention a lot of things and infinite numbers of words, and they fly from Islam like the arrow from the bow. Their faith does not pass their throats. Wherever you might encounter them, kill them! It is indeed so, as killing them brings many benefits on the

¹⁴¹ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 129a.

¹⁴² Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 177bff. However, in another place he praises the achievement of Catherine the Great, not only for expanding the empire, but also for founding new schools (*maktab-i Jadīd*), something which, in the context, appears to be positive and may shed a slightly different light on his later hostility towards the new-method schools. (Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* 283).

¹⁴³ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 147b.

resurrection day. They are that group about which the Prophet (God's peace upon him) has said that most of them are boys who recently have reached maturity."¹⁴⁴

In his *Kashkūl-i Salīmī* he devotes three pages to the resurrection, but any parallel between the *Jadīds* and the Last Day is absent here.¹⁴⁵ Nevertheless, a discourse laden with time-killing prophetic concepts can produce time and, hence, construct a future in the present temporality by an ethical dependent possibility of postponing the Last Day. Many Bukharan writers, especially before the turn of the century, did this by referring to the *Mujaddid*, the renewer of religion, which seems to have been a typical feature of the non-progress discourse in Bukhara, but Mīrzā Salīm-bīk is less optimistic than other writers, and apart from evoking the *Mujaddid*, he does not really seem interested in postponing the Last Day;

"...a strange story came to my mind. In the year 1329/1911 a young moonfaced friend of happiness (*sa'adat-i yār*) from the *sayyids* of Ḥasan and Ḥusayn, the supreme God's grace upon them, came, aged twenty-eight, to Bukhara the Noble from Mecca, and settled in the house of *'alam al-'ulamā*, the most skilled scholar of the age, *hājī* of the two blessed cities, and mufti of the sanctified soil (i.e. Bukhara). The mufti just mentioned told me (i.e. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk) that 'the above-mentioned youth was, despite his tender age, a master and trained in all sciences, so that the sciences I and people like me had were inferior compared to him. He spent two months and ten days in my house. When he was leaving I asked: 'there is a noble *ḥadīth* [which says] that before the resurrection there will appear a person from every century in my communities, he will become the renewer (*Mujaddid*) of religion, and restore (*iṣlāḥ*) my *sharī'a*. We have not seen him in previous centuries. Now, 29 years have passed since the beginning of this century, yet we have not heard about the *Mujaddid* from anywhere.' To this the dear

¹⁴⁴ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rīkh-i Salīmī* 136ab.

¹⁴⁵ See pp.150ff. It is very interesting to observe the absence of Shaykh Sirhindī and any mention of the *Mujaddid* in this work.

guest, the *sayyid*, said: 'Do you deny this noble *ḥadīth*?' I said: 'God forbid!' He said: 'They say that at the turn of every century there will, without exception, come forward a person of perfect grade from the communities of the greatest prophet and restore (*iṣlāḥ*) the religion of the gracious Prophet, God's blessing upon him. It is so now too. For 300 years the obscurity (*kasāfat*) has prevailed and has reached the 17th degree. The present *Mujaddid*'s power does not suffice.' I said: 'perhaps the *Mujaddids*' power differ?' He said: 'All *Mujaddids*' power is equal in their perfection, but as the obscurity is increasing day by day, their power does not suffice to avert it.' I asked: 'Will the obscurity even pass the 18th degree?' He smiled: 'As if you want the resurrection to be soon... In three years' time when it becomes 1332/1913–1914, it passes the 18th degree. At that time the power of imām Mahdī is required to oppose it.' I asked: 'What signs are there when the obscurity passes the 18th degree?' he answered: 'The occult sciences belong to the Highest God, and He presents some signs to his servants. The signs of the 18th degree are that when it becomes the year 1332/1913–1914, it is probable that there will not only be war between the states, but in the whole world, and there will be much bloodletting. Because of this, prices rise and famine begins. God Almighty knows better about events which will come.'¹⁴⁶ If life still remains, then after 12 years there will be happiness.' I asked: 'Is there a *Mujaddid* somewhere now?' He said: 'I will not tell you where the *Mujaddid* is. If you are blessed (*nasīb*), go to Mecca the Glorious, there you will see a *Mujaddid*.' Then he left. My firm belief is that he was this *sayyid*; it would not even be strange if he was imām Mahdī because they have said that when the obscurity passes the 18th level, then the power of the imām Mahdī is required. As his words foretold, in the year 1332/1913–1914 the war of the states began, and for four years the bloodletting has been great, millions and

¹⁴⁶ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk seems to have subscribed to the Iranian Persian word for future, *āyanda*, a future which was a part of the discourse on progress, thus signifying another earthly temporality. The word Salīm-bīk used here is the tajik present-future participle *mīshudagī*.

millions of people have been killed, and many countries have been destroyed. Its effects have reached the whole world. Because of this, prices rise and famine destroys the people, and everyone's disposition has become bitter. He said that after 12 years have passed you will see happiness. The noble *sayyid* was 28 years. After the above-mentioned period he will have reached 40 years. It is possible that he is imām Mahdī. God knows best.' It happened so that I (i.e. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk) had borrowed an extract of the *tafsīr Mirāt al-thaqalain* (a famous Koran commentary). In the beginning of the just-mentioned *tafsīr* it is written that 'I compiled this *tafsīr* in Medina the Pure close to the Prophet's garden, God's peace upon him, and it was revealed to me that 'You should call the *tafsīr Mirāt al-thaqalain*, and when it comes to the date of fulfilment of imām Mahdī, that will be in 1363/1943–1944.' I (i.e. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk) showed the above-mentioned *tafsīr* to the above-mentioned *hājī* mufti. He looked at it and said that the words of the *sayyid* from Mecca corresponds with the words of the *tafsīr*. According to glorious and noble *ḥadīthes* the signs of the resurrection are also coming closer..."¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Salīm-bīk. *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 191b–193a.

Conclusions

For the political-minded man, a person who is most interested in maximising power, ideological inclinations are eventually of secondary importance. It is very plausible that the two most powerful political actors in Bukhara between 1910 and 1920 were simply political men.¹⁴⁸ If so, *jadīdism* and its counter current were mere instruments for them. The nucleus of *Jadīds* as well as the *Qadīms* might very well have formed moral teams, united by conscience, and possibly a common ontology which, at least partly, was signified by a certain conception of historical time. Still, as the majority of the political actors based their political alliances on potential political benefits, their room for manoeuvre was rather limited, and they all had to play the same game with the same rules.¹⁴⁹

The majority of the population was probably fairly passive, and would just follow those authorities who made the most serious effort to mobilise them. In the capital there were the students and their teachers, who sometimes had their region as their lowest common denominator. However, this does not mean that an inherent regional unity existed which overshadowed all other loyalties. Rather the opposite seems to have been the norm.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁸ I do not deny that Burhān al-Dīn might have been an ignoramus in the eyes of the *Jadīds*, but I argue that this was not a prime issue. Until more research has been carried out, I would like to stress that Burhān al-Dīn's knowledge about the world might not have been very different from that of Baqā Khwāja, who was the *qāzī-yi kalān* when the *Jadīds* were most successful in their activities.

¹⁴⁹ The most common moral teams in Bukhara were obviously those simply consisting of an extended family. This helps to explain why many of the *Jadīds* were relatives. Moreover, in tense political situations most 'contract teams' probably dissolved into 'moral teams'.

¹⁵⁰ It is indeed very tempting to compare the ethnonymical classifications in use in Bukhara before the Bolshevik invasion with those in use in Tajikistan in the late and post-Soviet era. One of the main differences seems to have been the conceptualisation of territory. The *Khatlānī* students in Bukhara were mobilized through their loyalties to a teacher with whom they probably had something in common. However, this origin was not an imagined territorial community. *Khatlān* (or *Kūhistān*) were abstract areas without fixed borders, they had no corresponding institutions and no indigenous maps on which the names were marked out. When the

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk seems to have been rather typical in not allowing ontology and ideology to ever have a crucial influence over his loyalties. The prime aim was to establish as good a position as possible on the political arena; convictions and

persecution of the *Jadīds* reached its peak in 1918, there was never a battle between regions, because, at that time, the *Tūmānīs* also came out against the *Jadīds*, who increasingly came to be seen as being against Islam, especially after the Kolesov campaign. In fact, if the notion of territoriality had been the same in Bukhara 1918 as in Tajikistan in 1992, then the *Jadīds* would have had a better chance of winning the political battle, as they could have mobilised the population in and around the capital. However, this was not the case. People were accused of being *Jadīds* and then killed, and the classification lacked a territory. The situation in Dushanbe around 1990 was, in terms of territoriality, very different. Despite what Oliver Roy writes ("Groupes de Solidarité en Asie Centrale et en Afghanistan," *Les Annales de l'Autre Islam* [Paris] 4 [1997]), the *Kūlābīs* became an imagined community. It had not only all the necessary regional institutions, but also maps which facilitated this imagination, and there were also the local politicians who completed the creation of this imagined community in their calls for support directed towards the *Kūlābīs*. If *jadīd* lost all its 'toponymical' content (that is, if it ever had any), then the war in Tajikistan took on a completely different turn, and in the end only a regional content was left in the political classifications that had been so manipulated during the presidential campaign in 1991. The *Gharmīs* were killed primarily because they were born in Gharm, which was registered in their passports and thus known to the Ministry of Internal Affairs and its *Kūlābī* and Uzbek death squads in late 1992 and early 1993. Similarly the *Badakhshānīs* were killed because they could not pronounce the phoneme /h/. The *Kūlābī* solidarity networks which were to eventually unite the perestroika group *Ashkārā* with the local party committee in Kulab, strove to mobilize the inhabitants of Kulab in terms of an imagined community; such mobilizations would have been impossible in Bukhara, where the ethnonyms *Khatlānī/Kūhīstānī* and *Tūmānī* primarily signified student factions. In fact, Burhān al-Dīn's allies also mobilized the *Tūmānīs* in his support, and there is no reason to suppose that people in the *tūmāns* were friendly towards the *Jadīds* after the Kolesov attack in 1918. Moreover, territories that had not become sacred, *vaṭan* (motherland), *Tūmānī*, or *Khatlānī*, etc. were not political catchwords; indeed, there is nothing to testify that they ever were voiced in order to gain political support. However, households still seem to be the most stable social units in society, something which leaves its firm imprint on the dynamics of the solidarity networks. The dialectics of the dynamics and stability of these networks are of crucial importance for the survival of the individual, something which explains their ability to override a vast amount of loyalties usually considered as traditional.

beliefs were expressed or hidden (or even changed) depending on the situation. Still, we know from some sources that Salīm-bīk refused to socialise with 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Fīṭrat after the revolution, while still respecting him as a scholar.¹⁵¹ From what has been written above and due to a lack of other sources, isn't it most likely that this was a direct outcome of the alliance between the Bolsheviks and the *Jadīds*, and the destruction brought about during the Kolesov campaign in 1918, and the invasion in 1920?

Mīrzā Salīm-bīk was a servant in the fiscal administration, and his prime enemy was Mīrzā Naṣrullāh. Salīm-bīk thus used the battles between the 'ulamā for his own purposes, especially when he was at the political centre of the emirate, i.e. in the capital itself. His position in the political arena of the *umarā* might not have been very different. He probably strove to diminish the role of Mīrzā Naṣrullāh in this arena too, who was not only deposed as *qūshbīgī* in 1917, but actually brought to Kermine where he was executed together with his whole family after the Kolesov incident in 1918. Salīm-bīk pursued his career until 1920, when, after a year in exile and in prison, he began to work together with the *Tūmānī* 'ulamā and two uncles of the emir who had been imprisoned since the time of emir 'Abd al-Aḥad. Although the two uncles eventually ended up in Afghanistan, this kind of pronounced division in the ranks of political actors, like the one between Mīrzā Naṣrullāh and Mīrzā Salīm-bīk, was typical of the Bukharan society.¹⁵²

¹⁵¹ Interview with Naim Norkulov, 23th of November, 2001.

¹⁵² Each of the emir's sons usually had his own solidarity-network, and the crown prince usually had a different one to that of his father. When the emir died, an administrative reshuffling usually ensued. Against this background, it is quite likely that the imprisoned uncles of emir 'Ālim Khān were set free after the revolution and worked with the *Jadīds*. However, it is equally likely that they fled to Afghanistan when the Bolsheviks took control over the Bukharan political arena. Other divisions in the Bukharan society were not so very different. Mīrzā Naṣrullāh and Mīrzā Salīm-bīk had both been apprentices under Āstānaqul-bī bin 'Abbās-bī, but this did not stop them from being mortal enemies, something which became evident very soon after Āstānaqul-bī's death. Among the Bukharan *Jadīds*, the clearest split was between Fayṣullāh Khwājaev and 'Abd al-Qādir Muhiddinov (Muḥī al-Dīn Ūghlī). When Khwājaev sought the help of Kolesov in Tashkent, Muhiddinov went to Moscow; one of them ended up as first party secretary in Uzbekistan, the other in Tajikistan. The battle between Ṣadr al-Dīn and

Many questions have to remain unanswered when it comes to the political consequences of the ideological and discursive rupture. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk seems mainly to have frequented a more traditional group of literati, people the Muslim modernists rarely mentioned in favourable terms in their works. It might even be possible to assume that this group of literati in Tashkent played very much the same role for Mīrzā Salīm-bīk as the Tatar and Turkish modernists played for many of the *Jadīds*. We did, indeed, have two different conceptual systems, systems which were mutually exclusive in their reliance on prophecy and progress. Still, we have few testimonies apart from some works of Fīṭrat where the debate was never on a sophisticated level. However, denying the primacy of divine intervention and an imminent Last Day must have led to the authority of many a traditional 'ālim being questioned, but as the systems were leximatically overlapping, it is plausible that there were very few people who understood the difference between the prophetic discourse and the discourse on progress. It is worth noting that Mīrzā Salīm-bīk never seems to have pondered upon the *Jadīd* conception of progress, something which might have been a result of the very exclusiveness of the two systems. Still, "these terms in mutual usage had double meanings and different denotations according to the respective conceptual systems. The terminology, and perhaps the whole classification system,

'Abd al-Shukūr's families for the post as *qāzī-yi kalān* is also of considerable interest, especially when it comes to the historicity of this kind of conflict. The Ṣadr al-Dīn family was always a much more powerful actor on the political arena than 'Abd al-Shukūr's ever was. In one of his writings Sharīfjān Makhdūm claimed that the conflict between his family and that of Ṣadr al-Dīn dated from the 1870s. However, it is worth questioning whether Sharīfjān Makhdūm did not give the battle between the *Tūmānīs* and the *Khatlānīs* a historicity and a continuity it did not really have. All his writings date from after 1918, and were obviously tainted by his persecution and that of the *Jadīds* after the proclamation of Miller's manifesto in 1917 and the Kolesov attack on Bukhara in 1918. The alliances on the political arena in Bukhara probably looked rather different when, some time before 'Abd al-Shukūr's death, Sharīfjān Makhdūm's sister Ḥabība married Qārī Mas'ūd, who was none other than Burhān al-Dīn's brother. (Muḥammad Sharīfjān Makhdūm, *Rūznāma* ms., IVAN Uz., inv. no. 2177, 14b, 21a). Qārī Mas'ūd is also mentioned by Sāmī. (Sāmī, *Tarīkh-i* 126af [trans. 126]).

became a system of double signifiers,"¹⁵³ something especially beneficent to the discourse on progress. It was thus possible to admire many (but not all) *Jadīd*-works and the "new literature" without allowing it to change one's conception of historical time, and thus probably not even read it on basis of modern concepts of historical time. Mīrzā Salīm-bīk seems to be a very good example of this being absolutely possible.

Even if Mīrzā Salīm-bīk co-operated with the *Tūmānīs* after the revolution, he was never a *Taraqqīparvar*, a promoter of progress, a classification seemingly reserved for those who structured the concept *taraqqī* with horizontal metaphors, like many of the *Jadīds*.¹⁵⁴ Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's whole conceptual apparatus was based on prophetic rather than evolutionary development. For the *Jadīds*, the idealised cognitive model of *taraqqī* was situated in the West, but for Mīrzā Salīm-bīk the concept was fundamentally different; it was a constant struggle to live according to the divine injunctions as formulated in the past.¹⁵⁵ This is also evident in his literary works, which were mainly reproductions of classical Islamic works.¹⁵⁶ He was more Europhobic (including Russophobic) than were many of the *Jadīds*. For him, the purity of Islam had to be defended against knowledge about Islam produced in the West. The difference between Bukhara and Europe was religious rather than temporal. He probably never wrote about any evolutionary development, and the technological advancements in the West are never described in terms of time, i.e. the other is never described in terms of time, rather it is a question of being a Muslim or not. In a few instances, he even calls the Bolsheviks Christians.¹⁵⁷

¹⁵³ These are Thongchai Winichakul words about the emergence of modern concepts of spatial organisation in Thailand, but they fit very well to temporal concepts as well. See his *Siam Mapped: A History of the Geography of a nation* (Bangkok: Silkwood Books, 1998) 59.

¹⁵⁴ The *Taraqqīparvar* seems, in fact, to have been nothing more than a modern version of the *Mujaddid*.

¹⁵⁵ There is, for example, no evidence of Salīm-bīk questioning the concept *taqlīd*, but he still appears more as a neo-traditionalist than as a traditionalist.

¹⁵⁶ The translated works should, however, also be stressed, many of which aimed at a public who could not read Arabic. It is also important that his Persian was quite close to the Bukharan vernacular.

¹⁵⁷ Salīm-bīk, *Ta'rikh-i Salīmī* 228a.

There are other elements which seem typical of the prophetic discourse; the most easily discernible is the *Mujaddid*, whose primary function is to construct a future in sacred time. Related to that is obviously the Last Day, and despite only God knowing when this is,¹⁵⁸ Salīm-bīk gives us some information about some early warning signs of this day. Another element is the chronological markers, which are non-detached from naturally formed chronologies. The consequence is a bi-temporal ontology where only the present and the hereafter are recognised. This present is, however, not extended, as it was for the *Jadīds*, who through the modern concept of progress, measured human technological and social achievements by a universal yardstick, however abstract. For many of the *Jadīds*, not only did the immediate surroundings matter, but the range of experience became extended thanks to modern means of communications, especially the telegraph. This is not to be seen in Salīm-bīk's works.¹⁵⁹ For him the contemporary era was not a normative temporality, spatially situated in the West.

Despite the fact that after 1920 Salīm-bīk worked together with 'Abd al-Ra'ūf Fiṭrat, it is striking that all the characteristics applied by Fiṭrat to the *Qadīms* also fit Mīrzā Salīm-bīk very well: he did not recognise the importance of making progress (evolutionary development), nor the uniqueness of the present, or any temporalities other than the present and the hereafter, and he was engaged in predicting the Last Day. Even his work in the People's Soviet Republic of Bukhara, especially in the *vaqf*-administration, the most prophetic institution in the republic,¹⁶⁰ tallied with his conception of historical time. However, to some extent, Mīrzā Salīm-bīk was right: when Mikhail Frunze invaded

¹⁵⁸ Salīm-bīk, *Kashkūl-i Salīmī*. 13.

¹⁵⁹ There is something very ironical about the fact that Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's love story, i.e. his story about a Russian girl he fell in love with on a trip to St. Petersburg in 1885 (described in his *Ta'rīkh-i Salīmī* on fol. 92b–99a), was copied by a certain Sayyid Khwāja Valad Jalāl al-Dīn Khwāja, who also copied a Persian translation of Jules Verne's *Around the World in 80 Days* (dated 1335/1916–1917), and bound them in the same volume. (Today kept at the Institute of Orientalism and Written Heritage in Dushanbe, inv. no. 1898).

¹⁶⁰ I owe Munira Azzout my gratitude for this reflection on the temporal structure of the *vaqf*-administration.

Bukhara in 1920 and some of the *Jadīds* formed a new government, it meant the end of the *ḥukūmat* (i.e. the old government) and the rule of *sharī'a*, and some of the *Jadīds* did, indeed, become infidels (communists). In many ways it also meant an end to Mīrzā Salīm-bīk's world.

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